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The Faces of Coercion: The Legal
Regulation of Labor Conflict in Ontario,
1880-1889
ERIC TUCKER
Until recently, North American labor law historiography has been dom-
inated by the view that the legal regime regulating trade unions and
collective bargaining has passed through three stages of development:
repression, toleration, and promotion. This evolutionary narrative served
the function ofjustifying current collective bargaining schemes by show-
ing them to be the progressive realization of political and industrial
pluralism.' Confidence in the narrative, however, is eroding. In part,
this is fuelled by the crisis of the current collective bargaining regime.
It no longer appears to be able to deliver the goods.2 Not coincidentally,
critical scholars have also chosen this moment to scrutinize the Whiggish
history produced by writers committed to the Wagner Act model and
have found it wanting.3
This article is part of a larger study of Canadian labor law before the
i. For example, see A. W. R. Carrothers et al., Collective Bargaining Law in Canada,
2d ed. (Toronto, 1986), pt. 1; Charles 0. Gregory, Labor and the Law, 2d rev. ed. (New
York, 1961), 13-17.
2. See Daniel Drache and Harry Glasbeek, The Changing Workplace (Toronto, 1992)
(Canada); Kim Moody, An Injury to All (London, 1988) (United States); Regulating
Labour: The State, Neo-Conservatism and Industrial Relations, ed. Larry Haiven et al.
(Toronto, 1990) (international and comparative).
3. David Brody, "Labor History, Industrial Relations, and the Crisis of American
Labor" Industrial and Labor Relations Review 43 (1989) makes this link explicitly. The
critical literature is vast. See Christopher L. Tomlins, "'Of the Old Time Entombed':
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advent of statutory collective bargaining, which questions the traditional
periodization and the meanings of the categories.4 It is often an un-
articulated premise that the exercise by employers of their superior
economic power, as imparted and structured through the law of property
and contract, is not coercion. Rather, the analysis is restricted to direct
state coercion, exercised through the criminal law, the police, and the
injunction. This framework produces a partial view of the role of law
and interferes with an analysis of the strategic choices made by workers
and employers. By bringing 'normal' market relations back in, we can
more fully examine the nuances of coercion and consent at a given
time.
Trade unions in Ontario during the 1880s underwent unprecedented
growth as local and national organizations which had disintegrated or
become dormant at the end of the 1870s re-emerged and grew, while
new organizations, such as the Knights of Labor, took root and reached
workers who never had been members of trade unions. Accompanying
this upsurge of labor organization was a sharp increase in the number
of strikes. There were nearly twice as many strikes in Ontario between
1880 and 1890 as there had been between 1860-1879.- In addition to
the strike, workers experimented with other economic tactics, such as
the boycott, in an effort to pressure employers into recognizing their
unions and agreeing to terms, conditions, and practices acceptable to
them. Workers also became active in federal, provincial, and local pol-
itics and were successful in having a number of their concerns addressed
legislatively.
It might have been expected that this "uprising" of labor would have
triggered efforts by employers and state officials to use more direct state
coercion, including court actions and vigorous policing, in an effort to
contain this movement and limit its effectiveness. Some of this did
happen, but it is fair to say that, compared to some other jurisdictions
The Resurrection of the American Working Class and the Emerging Critique of American
Industrial Relations," Industrial Relations Law Journal 10 (1988); Raymond L. Hogler,
"Labor History and Critical Labor Law: An Interdisciplinary Approach to Workers'
Control:' Labor History 30 (1989).
4. Judy A. Fudge, "Voluntarism, Compulsion and the 'Transformation' of Canadian
Labour Law during World War II' in Canadian and Australian Labour History, ed.
Gregory S. Kealey and Greg Patmore (Sydney, 1990), 81; Eric Tucker, " 'That Indefinite
Area of Toleration': Criminal Conspiracy and Trade Unions in Ontario, 1837-77,'
Labour/Le Travail 27 (1991).
5. Bryan D. Palmer, "Labour Protest and Organization in Nineteenth-Century Can-
ada, 1820-1890:' Labour/Le Travail 20 (1987).
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(notably the United States),6 their efforts in this direction were relatively
modest and only partially successful. It was not until the beginning of
the twentieth century that direct state coercion became more widespread
and effective.
To explain this, recent discussions about the role of law in shaping
the labor movement are joined. In particular, Forbath and Hattam have
argued that the difference between judicial supremacy in the United
States and parliamentary supremacy in England, combined with other
differences in the two nations' forms of government, provides the key
to understanding the divergent paths taken by their respective labor
movements.7 They both explicitly reject the more sociological expla-
nations of American exceptionalism, which have dominated until re-
cently. While a full comparison of Canada, the United States, and
England is beyond the scope of this article, my examination of this
period suggests that, in their enthusiasm to "bring the state back in,"'8
Forbath and Hattam have given inadequate consideration to political-
economic influences on the level of class conflict, and the ability of
employers to maintain their dominance without direct state coercion.
For example, the extreme hostility of American employers to trade
unions during this period is taken as a given, rather than as something
that needs to be explained, and the violent conduct of the police and
militia in policing strikes- under the direction of the executive branch
of the state, not the judiciary-is not accounted for.9 More attention
6. The historical development of the legal regulation of trade unions and their ac-
tivities during this period has received much attention lately. See William Fbrbath, Law
and the Shaping of the American Labor Movement (Cambridge, 1991); and idem, "Courts,
Constitutions, and Labor Politics in England and America: A Study of the Constitutive
Power of Law,' Law and Social Inquiry 16 (1991); Victoria C. Hattam, Labor Visions
and State Power (Princeton, 1993); Daniel R. Ernst, "Free Labor, the Consumer Interest,
and the Law of Industrial Disputes, 1885-1900," American Journal of Legal History
36 (1992); Herbert Hovenkamp, "Labor Conspiracies in American Law, 1880-1930:'
Texas Law Review 66 (1988); Leon Fink, "Labor, Liberty, and the Law: Trade Unionism
and the Problem of the American Constitutional Order;' Journal of American History
74 (1987); Haggai Hurvitz, "American Labor Law and the Doctrine of Entrepreneurial
Property Rights: Boycotts, Courts, and the Judicial Reorientation of 1886-1895,' In-
dustrial Relations Law Journal 8 (1986). For an excellent introduction to the new labor
law scholarship, see Labor Law in America, ed. Christopher L. Tomlins and Andrew
J. King (Baltimore, 1992).
7. Forbath, "Courts, Constitutions:' and Hattam, Labor Visions, chap. 5.
8. Peter B. Evans et al., eds., Bringing the State Back In (Cambridge, 1985).
9. See Sanford M. Jacoby, "American Exceptionalism Revisited: The Importance of
Management" in Masters to Managers, ed. Sanford M. Jacoby (New York, 1991), 173;
Melvyn Dubofsky, "Book Review of Law and the Shaping of the American Labor
Movement, by William Fbrbath," Industrial and Labor Relations Review 45 (1992).
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needs to be given to the complex interplay between institutional struc-
tures and material conditions and the way they mutually shape the
conduct of class relations.
Arguments about how and why law is used coercively cannot proceed
in a factual background. There is a real need to clarify the law and,
more important, to illuminate its use during labor conflicts in Ontario
during the 1880s, because both Canadian labor historians and labor
lawyers have largely ignored this period.'° The three detailed case studies
that follow examine exceptional strikes where direct state coercion was
used. Aside from the benefit of the paper trails these strikes left, we
can see through these studies both what the law was, why it was invoked,
and how it responded-or failed to respond-to demands placed upon
it. These case studies are supplemented in the conclusion with cumu-
lative data on the incidence of judicial/police interventions in strikes
in Ontario during this period.
Legal Starting Points
For most of the nineteenth century and, indeed, for hundreds of years
previously, the obligations of servants to masters were enforced through
the criminal law. This, as Kahn-Freund noted some time ago, was
consistent with a scheme in which the obligation to serve arose from
status." By the nineteenth century, however, the obligation to serve was
derived from the notionally voluntary agreement of the parties, man-
ifested in the contract of employment. Although criminal enforcement
of contractual obligations was becoming increasingly anomalous in mar-
ket regimes, workers were liable to be, and frequently were, prosecuted
for breaching their contracts of employment in England and Ontario
until the end of the third quarter of the nineteenth century. This was
rationalized on the grounds that employers, as propertied people, could
answer for their damages in money while propertyless workers could
only answer with their bodies. It was also consistent with the hierarchical
structure of the master and servant relation, many of whose assumptions
10. For example, historian Bob Russell, Back to Work? (Scarborough, 1990) evinces
a greater interest in law than most, but omits 1877 to 1900 without comment. Similarly,
Bryan Palmer, Working-Class Experience: Rethinking the History of Canadian Labour
1880-1991, 2d ed. (Toronto, 1992) integrates law into his discussion of most periods,
but not 1880-95. For a legal example, see Carrothers, Collective Bargaining Law, 11-
30. I call attention to these gaps not to criticize the authors but to show the need for
more work to be done.
11. Otto Kahn-Freund, "Blackstone's Neglected Child: The Contract of Employ-
ment," Law Quarterly Review 93 (1977): 522.
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had been imported into the contract of employment, thereby main-
taining important continuities between the two regimes largely to the
benefit of employers. It was only through extensive labor agitation that
simple breaches of the employment contract were decriminalized.' 2
Combinations of workers were also regulated through the criminal
law. A series of statutes and judicial decisions dating back to the four-
teenth century made it a crime for workers in England to combine for
the purpose of increasing wages or shortening hours of work. Moreover,
actions taken in support of a combination's objectives, such as plac-
arding and picketing, were also culpable.' 3 The precise status of much
of this law in Ontario was never determined conclusively." Nevertheless,
when, in 1872, George Brown, publisher of the Globe, charged striking
members of the Toronto Typographical Union with conspiracy for,
among other acts, simply combining for the purpose of shortening hours,
the federal government was quick to intervene. It enacted legislation
closely modeled on the English Trade Union Act (TUA) and Criminal
Law Amendment Act (CLAA) passed in 187 1.'"
Although not without ambiguities, the Canadian TUA immunized
12. The importance of the continuity is emphasized by Karen Orren, Belated Feu-
dalism (Cambridge, 1991), 70, where she claims, "the law of master and servant was
at the foundation of capitalist development and industrialism... " Also see Christopher
L. Tomlins, "The Ties That Bind: Master and Servant in Massachusetts, 1800-1850:'
Labor History 30 (1989). The Breaches of Contract Act, 1877, S.C. 1877, c. 35, ended
the use of criminal sanctions in Canada except in the circumstances specified in the
statute. This happened two years after the enactment of identical legislation in England.
On Canada, see Paul Craven, "The Law of Master and Servant in Mid-Nineteenth-
Century Ontario:' in Essays in the History of Canadian Law, vol. 1, ed. David Flaherty
(Toronto, 1981), 175. On England, see Daphne Simon, "Master and Servant' in De-
mocracy and the Labour Movement, ed. J. Saville (London, 1954), 160.
The rationalization became harder to sustain after direct imprisonment of debtors
was abolished, although some commentators persisted. For example, see James Edward
Davis, The Labour Laws (London, 1875), 8-11, 86-95. There were, of course, other
more coercive labor systems operating earlier in the century including slavery and the
quasi-military code of discipline of the fur trading companies. Robin Winks, Blacks in
Canada: A History (Montreal, 1971), 1-113; Hamar Foster, "Mutiny of the Beaver Law
and Authority in the Fur Trade Navy, 1835-1840,' in Glimpses of Canadian Legal
History, ed. Dale Gibson and W. Wesley Pue (Winnipeg, 1991), 15.
13. For a detailed examination of the development of this law, see John V. Orth,
Combination and Conspiracy (Oxford, 1991).
14. For differing views, see Paul Craven, "Workers' Conspiracies in Toronto:' Labour!
Le Travail 14 (1984) and Tucker, "That Indefinite Area.'
15. S.C. 1872, cc. 30, 31. Among the numerous accounts of these events, see Bernard
Ostry, "Conservatives, Liberals, and Labour in the 1870's,' Canadian Historical Review
41 (1960); and Mark Chartrand, "The First Canadian Trade Union Legislation: An
Historical Perspective:' Ottawa Law Review 16 (1984).
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workers from being prosecuted for common law criminal conspiracy
merely because they had joined a trade union whose purposes were in
restraint of trade.' 6 The CLAA proscribed actions which might be taken
during a dispute between masters and workers. Offenses included vi-
olence to persons or property, threats or intimidation, and molestation
or obstruction. Persistent following, hiding tools, and watching and
besetting were deemed to be molestation or obstruction. Because these
crimes were broadly defined, and because jurisdiction to try accused
workers rested with magistrates who were perceived to be hostile, trade
unionists lobbied for repeal of the CLAA. They were partially successful.
Amendments to the CLAA defined offenses more narrowly and decrim-
inalized peaceful picketing. 7
Trade union activities were also governed by the general criminal
law. Striking workers could be charged with a variety of offenses, in-
cluding assault, riot, unlawful assembly, and destruction of property.
Private common law was rarely used either to secure a remedy against
workers who breached their contracts of employment or to prevent
trade unions from forming or acting. Earlier English cases held that
trade unions were unincorporated associations that had no identity
distinct from that of their individual members. The courts also held
that they were unlawful associations because they were formed for an
illegal purpose -restraint of trade. Because of this, agreements with
employers were legally unenforceable as were contracts between mem-
bers of the union.'" This created substantial difficulties for unions seeking
to protect their funds, since dishonest officers could not be held liable
for breaching their obligations. Intra-union disputes were, in effect, non-
justiciable. The TUA provided only partial relief. Section 3 of the act
stipulated that agreements or trusts of trade unions should not be void
or voidable merely because its purposes were in restraint of trade. This
gave unions the ability to protect their funds in court. Section 4, however,
declared that most contracts between members of trade unions, in-
cluding contracts concerning conditions of employment, union dues or
penalties, and benefits, were unenforceable.
The civil liability of trade unions and their members to employers
had hardly been considered before 1880. The tort of inducing breach
of contract was recognized in England in 1853 and followed in Ontario
16. Technically, the immunity only extended to workers who joined a registered trade
union. This distinction was ignored in practice and eliminated in the statute consoli-
dation of 1886. R.S.C. 1886, c. 173.
17. S.C. 1875, c. 39; S.C. 1876, c. 37.
18. Hornby v. Close (1867), 10 Cox C.C. 393.
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in 1879, but neither case involved a trade union or an industrial action.'9
In another case, Springhead Spinning Company v. Riley, the employer
obtained an injunction to restrain the issuing of placards and adver-
tisements calling on workers not to apply for positions because of a
dispute with the union. Vice Chancellor Malins found that the de-
fendants were guilty of issuing criminal threats and of criminal inter-
ference that tended toward the destruction of property. His conclusion
was based on broad definitions of the crimes of threatening and inter-
fering, as well as a wide interpretation of the scope of property rights.
Malins made it clear that he was eager to accommodate employers
having disputes with trade unions.
In the meantime I would only make this observation, that by the Act of
Parliament it is recited that all such proceedings are injurious to trade
and commerce, and dangerous to the security and personal freedom of
individual workmen, as well as the security of the property and persons
of the public at large; and if it should turn out that this Court has
jurisdiction to prevent these misguided misled workmen from committing
these acts of intimidation, which go to the destruction of that property
which is the source of their own support and comfort in life, I can only
say that it will be one of the most beneficial jurisdictions that this Court
has ever exercised. 20
Malins's broad interpretation of the court's equitable jurisdiction to
issue injunctions to protect property from damage was rejected in a
subsequent case that did not involve a labor dispute. The court reaf-
firmed the general principle that injunctions do not lie to prevent crimes
or publications of libel.2 ' While this later judgment did not preclude
all uses of injunctions in relation to trade disputes, it surely cast con-
siderable doubt on their availability. In any event, neither English nor
Canadian employers in the 1870s marched off to the court to explore
further the willingness of the judges to use their equitable jurisdiction
to enjoin trade union activity.2
In sum, by 1880 criminal law sanctions for simple breaches of contract
by employees had been repealed, trade unions were no longer criminal
19. Lumley v. Gye (1853), 2 El. & BI. 216; Hewitt v. The Ontario Copper Lightning
Rod Co. (1879), 44 UCQB 287. For an interesting discussion of the gender dimensions
of Lumley, see Lea S. VanderVelde, "Hidden Dimensions in Labor Law History: Gender
Variations on the Theme of Free Labor" in King and Tomlins, Labor Law in America,
99.
20. Springhead Spinning Company v. Riley (1868), L.R. 6 Eq. 562-63.
21. Prudential Assurance Company v. Knott (1875), L.R. 10 Ch. App. 142.
22. A. W. J. Thomson, "The Injunction in Trade Disputes in Britain Before 1910"
Industrial and Labor Relations Review 19 (1965-66).
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conspiracies per se, much trade union activity was still criminalized-
although there had been some relaxation-and employers had not
seriously explored the private law jurisdiction of the courts in relation
to disputes with their employees.
Case Studies
The Labor Injunction in the Toronto Plasterers' Strike, 1883
The revival of economic activity at the beginning of the 1880s also
initiated a new round of conflict between workers and their employers.
Yet, despite the increase in strike activity, employers did not, on the
whole, exhibit a high level of antagonism toward unions and their
activities. Indeed, they seemed to accept a certain level of conflict as
an inevitable part of a market system of wage determination. For ex-
ample, an editorial on the new wave of strikes published in the Monetary
Times, an important Canadian business journal, noted that while the
public had rights that must be protected, "the right to strike cannot be
interfered with" 23 The following week, the journal noted that "the spirit
in which the strikes ... have been carried on shows a great improvement
upon former perturbations in the labor market" and that "a spirit of
accommodation has been shown on both sides; on which both employers
and employed are to be congratulated " '4
The first round of conflict in the Toronto building trades that decade
occurred in April 1882, when journeymen carpenters, painters, and
plasterers' laborers all went on strike for increased wages. Pickets were
sent to various worksites and shops around the city to convince current
employees to join the strike, while railway stations and immigrant sheds
were watched to intercept replacement workers who might be hired by
the employers. The carpenters' strike was by far the largest of the three.
Their president, Thomas Moor, cautioned the pickets "not to step
beyond the law, but to use only moral persuasion, as one false step
would be diligently used by their antagonists against them."25 His advice
was heeded. When the strike was settled four weeks later, on terms
favorable to the carpenters, no charges had been laid, and the strikers
were complimented by the mayor for their orderliness. 26 The painters
23. Monetary Times, May 20, 1881, p. 1349.
24. Ibid., May 27, 1881, p. 1385.
25. Mail, April 6, 1882, p. 8, col. 4. An earlier caution was reported in Mail, April
4, 1882, p. 8, col. 3.
26. Ibid., April 29, 1882, p. 12, cols. 3-4.
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settled their strike shortly after the carpenters, also on favorable terms
and without incident.27 The Master Plasterers' Association (MPA), how-
ever, succeeded in resisting the demands of the laborers who returned
to work largely on their employers' terms.
28
The tone of the editorial writers at the Monetary Times remained
philosophical. Disputes over wages were unavoidable since the price of
labor had to rise and fall according to the circumstances and employers
were no more inclined to offer increases than workers were to volunteer
decreases. Workers would be less inclined to strike if they became more
sensitive to the realities of the labor market and stopped trying to
counteract the laws of supply and demand, but there was little bitterness
toward, or fear of, trade unions.29 It was only later that summer that
a change of attitude could be discerned. In its first editorial to mention
the Knights of Labor, the Monetary Times commented on the consol-
idation of "trade societies" and how this had led to longer strikes during
the past spring. Because markets must always be the ultimate deter-
minant of wage levels, this was ultimately disadvantageous to the work-
ers. The editorial writers opined that unions' "power for mischief is at
least as great as that for good" and criticized speeches made at a recent
labor demonstration in Toronto that called for working-class represen-
tation in the legislature. 0
There were an unprecedented number of strikes in 1883.3" Most
strikes were small local affairs. One notable exception was the teleg-
raphers' strike. Under the auspices of the Knights of Labor, the teleg-
raphers had succeeded in organizing a substantial portion of the tele-
graph operators in both the United States and Canada. When the
telegraph companies on both sides of the border refused the unions'
demands, a pre-arranged signal to strike went out across the lines on
July 16. Although ultimately unsuccessful, the strike brought the Knights
of Labor to prominence in Canada.32 It also raised the level of anxiety
about trade unions.
27. Ibid., May 2, 1882, p. 8, cols. 2-3.
28. Globe, May 9, 1882, p. 8, col. 1.
29. Monetary Times, April 17, 1882, p. 1235; ibid., April 21, 1882, pp. 1293-95;
ibid., May 5, 1882, p. 1360.
30. Ibid., August 11, 1882, p. 151.
31. Indeed, there were as many strikes in 1883 as there were in 1886, the year most
closely associated with labor's uprising in this decade. See Palmer, "Labour Protest."
32. For a detailed discussion of the strike, see Eugene Forsey, "The Telegraphers'
Strike of 1883;' in Transactions of the Royal Society of Canada, ser. 4, 9 (1971): 245.
Also see Gregory S. Kealey, Toronto Workers' Respond to Industrial Capitalism 1867-
1892 (Toronto, 1980), 177; and Gerald Grob, Workers and Utopia (Chicago, 1969), 61-
63.
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The Monetary Times saw the Knights as "the hidden hand" behind
this and other recent strikes. Its earlier fear about the effect of a con-
solidation of unions was now realized. "The motive for the surrender
of autonomy by each separate branch was to gain the power of combined
numbers to enforce any demands it might have to make. It was thought
that the common purse would be strong enough to enable strikers to
hold out longer than they could if each labor section were left to its
own unaided efforts. In this belief there was a certain amount of truth:'
Not only were the Knights potentially powerful, but they were "going
to make war on capital, in the legislative arena, as well as in Trades'
Union rooms." Fortunately, the Knights were not omnipotent and other
groups of workers had refused to obey their orders. "The natural laws
of supply and demand" remained triumphant.33
The telegraphers' strike also resulted in the publication of an article
in the Canadian Law Times, a professional journal, on the law of strikes.
The author, William Seton Gordon, could not resist the opportunity
to express his hostility toward trade unions. The operators were "ob-
structing for their own purposes a most important channel of business
communication, and subjecting the citizens of this country and the
United States to the inconvenience and loss entailed by a general strike."
Their effort was futile and, indeed, harmful to themselves. Much like
the Monetary Times, Gordon firmly believed in liberal economic or-
thodoxy. "[C]ompetition alone, must, in the end, be permitted to reg-
ulate the amount of compensation" and "[t]o annul permanently the
effect of an economic law as infallible in its operation as any physical
law, may well be deemed a hopeless undertaking "'34
Sandwiched in between these comments was a discussion of the legal
liability of telegraph companies to their customers as common carriers
and the legal regulation of strikes under common law and statute.
Gordon noted that injunctions could be obtained against unions and
cited Springhead Spinning as a precedent. This was significant because
the case had been virtually ignored or forgotten. For example, contem-
33. Monetary Times, August 17, 1883, p. 179. See also Canadian Manufacturer
August 24, 1883, pp. 607-8, where the Knights are referred to as "socialist and revo-
lutionary" and a "dangerous and most unsatisfactory organization.'
34. William Seton Gordon, "Strikes and Strikers in Their Legal Aspect' Canadian
Law Times 3 (1883). Gordon was born in New York and received a B.A. from Columbia
University before coming to Canada. He later returned to New York where he continued
to practice law. Henry James Morgan, ed., Canadian Men and Women of the Time, 2d
ed. (Toronto, 1912), 459.
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porary English texts on injunctions did not even suggest that strikes or
strike activity could be enjoined.35
Plasterers had a long history of union organization both in England
and Toronto. Toronto plasterers participated in the first union formed
in the city in 1831 but, as with most local unions, their fortunes rose
and fell with the economy.36 With the upswing in the economy in the
early 1880s, the Operative Plasterers' Association (OPA) re-established
a strong presence in the city, as did other building trades' unions. Their
employers, typically small contractors in competitive markets, also
formed associations.3 7
In 1883 the OPA had an agreement with the organization of their
employers, the Master Plasterers' Association (MPA), which provided
that union members were to be paid $2.50 a day. The union itself had
rules restricting admission to qualified journeymen. The MPA became
dissatisfied with this arrangement because, in its view, not all members
of the union could perform finer work. They wanted two classifications
to be created with different wage scales for each. First-class workers
would be paid $2.50 while less skilled workers would be paid $1.50.
Difficulties came to a head in October 1883.
D. Ward was an MPA member who employed five union men, in-
cluding Higgins. After two or three days' work, Higgins was discharged
for incompetence in the performance of fine work and paid at the $1.50
rate for the time that he had worked. The union ordered the rest of
the men off the job until Ward agreed to pay the union rate of $2.50.
On October 11, the MPA met and voted to blacklist the four men who
35. Springhead was not cited at all in William Kerr, A Treatise on the Law and
Practice ofInjunctions, 2d ed. (London, 1878). The first mention of an injunction against
a union appeared in the third edition (London, 1888), 564-65 in relation to actions
brought by members. It was only in the fourth edition (London, 1903) that the heading
"trade union" appeared in the index and a new section was added to deal with injunctions
to enjoin nuisances connected to trade disputes (241-44). In William Joyce, The Law
and Practice of Injunctions in Equity (London, 1872), Springhead was cited in a section
on injunctions in relation to criminal activity. There was no direct discussion of in-
junctions against unions in any context.
36. In England, local societies came together to create the National Association of
Operative Plasterers in England in 1860. See W. Hamish Fraser, Trade Unions and
Society (London, 1974), 19. An unsuccessful attempt was made to establish a branch
of the National Association in Halifax in 1867. In Toronto, they were involved in the
United Amicable Trade and Benefit Society of Journeymen Bricklayers, Plasterers, and
Masons. Eugene Forsey, Trade Unions in Canada 1812-1902 (Toronto, 1982), 19, 57,
85, 93-94.
37. According to the Monetary Times, April 21, 1882, p. 1294, "The competition
between employers to get work is much greater than the competition to get workers:'
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had walked off Ward's job until a suitable apology was received. They
also agreed that any member of the MPA who violated the blacklist
would be required to pay a twenty-five dollar fine to the association.
The resolution was communicated to the OPA the following day. On
October 15, the OPA met and informed the MPA that, unless its res-
olution was withdrawn by 10 pm on October 17, the OPA would strike
all the shops of MPA members. No response was received and fifty-
three OPA members struck the MPA.3 8
The OPA's strike committee set up watches at railway stations and
at their employers' shops to guard against the MPA bringing in outside
help. It also sought and obtained financial assistance from other local
unions and from the Toronto Trades and Labour Council (TTLC),
which also unsuccessfully attempted to persuade the MPA to accept
arbitration. 9 The MPA also drew on broader networks of employer
solidarity to prevent OPA members from getting work in other building
trades or from getting contracts directly from contractors."°
The strike began to heat up in its second week when the MPA at-
tempted to import scab labor. The union was mostly successful in
defeating these efforts by following MPA recruiters, intercepting the
men they hired and convincing or bribing them not to come.1 On
November 7, two members of the MPA, Hynes and Lockwood, hired
a plasterer, Mr. Moriarity, and succeeded in getting him to Toronto.
The strike committee learned of his presence and sent a delegation,
including Jacob Fisher, the OPA's president, to speak to him at his hotel.
In their affidavits, Hynes and Lockwood alleged that the union men
intimidated Moriarity with threats of violence and forcibly took pos-
session of his tools. 42
38. The account is derived from Hynes et al. v. Fisher et al. (1883), 4 O.R. 60; Globe,
October 18, 1883, p. 6, col. 1; Mail, October 18, 1883, p. 8, col. 4.
39. Globe, October 19, 1883, p. 6, col. 3; ibid., October 20, 1883, p. 2, col. 4; ibid.,
October 23, 1883, p. 6, col. 5; ibid., October 24, 1883, p. 2, col. 4; ibid., October 24,
1883, p. 6, col. 1; ibid., October 25, 1883, p. 6, col. 1; ibid., October 26, 1883, p. 2,
col. 3; ibid., November 3, 1883, p. 3, cols. 1-2; TTLC, Minutes, October 19 and
November 2, 1883.
40. Globe, October 22, 1883, p. 8, col. 4; ibid., October 23, 1883, p. 6, col. 5; ibid.,
October 26, 1883, p. 2, col. 3.
41. Ibid., October 29, 1883, p. 2, cols. 1-2 and October 30, p. 6, col. I (two plasterers
from Quebec); ibid., November 1, 1883, p. 6, col. 2 and November 2, 1883, p. 6, col.
4 (three plasterers from Cobourg and Walkerton); ibid., November 6, 1883, p. 6, col.
4 and November 7, 1883, p. 7, cots. 1-2 (plasterer from Guelph); ibid., November 9,
1883, p. 6, col. 4; Mail, November 6, 1883, p. 8, col. 4 (plasterer from Gait); ibid.,
November 7, 1883, p. 8, col. 5 (unsuccessful attempt to intercept two plasterers from
Lindsay).
42. Globe, November 8, 1883, p. 6, col. 3; Hynes v. Fisher, 61-62.
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On November 6, the Globe and the Mail printed a letter from Hynes
defending the position of the MPA. Hynes concluded by threatening
legal action. "There are numbers of men throughout the country who
want work, and we have it to do, and shall insist upon the strong arm
of the law in permitting them to work." Mr. C. Chase, chair of OPA's
strike committee, responded. He castigated the MPA for seeking as-
sistance from other employers in the building trades "to crush the
manhood" of the "poor plasterers" and challenged the MPA to take
legal action. "If we have violated the laws of the land the bosses can
take proceedings with pleasure. I am sure they won't insult us by not
doing so.... He calls on the strong arm of the law for protection. Mr.
Hynes can have all the law. We simply want justice.'"43
On November 9, the MPA instituted an action against the plasterers
for damages of one thousand dollars and sought an ex parte injunction.
Their lawyer was one of the Blakes, both of whom were leading equity
lawyers of the period. Chief Justice Wilson granted the injunction the
following day, good until November 13. It restrained the named de-
fendants and their agents from hindering or molesting the plaintiffs as
they attempted to hire workers and from intimidating, hindering, or
molesting those who were working or who might be willing to work
for the plaintiffs."
The Palladium of Labor (a newspaper closely associated with the
Knights of Labor) perhaps on the basis of the MPA's threat to bring an
action, and always ready to get in a jab at the legal profession, published
a fictional account of a master visiting a lawyer.45 The scene opens with
the lawyer, Mr. Briefless, and the client commiserating over the insolence
of the lower classes and, in particular, over the refusal of a union to
allow the master to pay different wages to good and bad workers. The
client complains of this gross violation of the liberty of the subject to
engage a man at any price for which he is willing to work. "These
unions, sir, are the curse of the country. They should be put down by
law." The lawyer agrees but reminds his client that "the scoundrels have
votes and are so unprincipled that they might vote against their own
party to punish the government that did it' 6 Their discussion turns
43. Ibid., November 6, 1883, p. 6, cols. 3-4; ibid., November 8, 1883, p. 6, col. 3;
Mail, November 6, 1883, p. 8, col. 4; ibid., November 7, 1883, p. 8, col. 5.
44. Hynes v. Fisher, 61-63; Globe, November 10, 1883, p. 14, col. I.
45. Palladium of Labor November 10, 1883, p. 2, cols. 4-5.
46. Presumably, this comment refers to the success of Toronto workers in defeating
J. J. Withrow, a Liberal candidate in the 1883 elections for Toronto mayor. Withrow
was a master carpenter whose activities during the 1882 strike had antagonized labor.
Kealey, Toronto Workers, 224-25; Globe, January 1, 1883, p. 6, cols. 1-3. On the same
Law and History Review
to the cause of the visit. The client would like the lawyer to take a case
and offers to pay costs plus a ten-dollar fee. The lawyer rejects the offer
claiming that it would be unprofessional not to charge the amount fixed
by the legal tariff. The client responds by unfavorably comparing Mr.
Briefless with more senior members of the bar such as Blake or Dalton
McCarthy. "But you see you are only a new beginner in the business
and you ought to work cheap at first. Your time is not as valuable as
that of a leading professional man." The client says he will take his
case to another young lawyer, Mr. Hardup, who he is sure will accept
it for ten dollars. The lawyer becomes indignant and threatens that he
will have Hardup disbarred by the Law Society for misconduct if he
takes the case for less than the tariff. The client is amazed that Mr.
Briefless, who just a moment ago had said that a man had a right to
sell his labor for whatever he could get for it, is now prepared to interfere
with the liberty of the subject. "For all I can see, your Law Society is
no better than a trade union." The lawyer denies the analogy, citing the
difference between a professional gentleman and a mechanic. The client
walks out in disgust, expressing the hope that, if trade unions are ever
abolished, they begin with the Law Society.
The OPA seems to have viewed the injunction with as little regard
as the Palladium of Labor viewed the legal profession and its monopoly.
Although they retained a senior Toronto lawyer, B. B. Osler, to represent
them, picketers continued as they had before the injunction. For ex-
ample, on November 12, another member of the MPA proceeded to
Guelph to hire two plasterers. One man agreed to return with him. On
the return trip, two members of the OPA, Alexander McCord and David
Jenkins, boarded the train at Carleton station. By the time they reached
Union station, the worker had agreed to return to Guelph immediately.47
The injunction was continued on November 13, but proceedings were
adjourned to permit cross-examination on the affidavits.48 The MPA
was back in court on November 16, seeking to have McCord and Jenkins
jailed for contempt of court for their actions on November 12. Wilson
agreed to hear the motion to commit on November 20, although this
page that this fictional account appeared, an editorial appeared calling on workers to
blacklist the bosses of the plastering trade and to use the ballot to punish them, as they
had done to Withrow. Palladium of Labor, November 10, 1883, p. 2, col. 2.
47. Hynes v. Fisher (McCord and Jenkins Case) (1883), 4 O.R. 78.
48. There was also a report that the union was going to bring an conspiracy action
against the MPA. Mail, November 13, 1883, p. 8, col. 2 and November 14, 1883, p. 8,
col. 2. There is no record that such an action was commenced.
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was later put over in the hope that an amicable settlement could be
arranged.49
This was not to be the case. Despite the flurry of legal activity the
conflict only intensified. On November 19, a skirmish between strikers
and scabs resulted in the police being called." There was another con-
frontation the following day and one of the scabs, James Jenkins, swore
out warrants against two of the striking plasterers, Alexander McCord
and Frederick Leach, who were arrested and charged with intimidation.
Bail was raised and they were released the same day.5
Further appearances in Magistrate Denison's police court and before
Justice Wilson followed. Wilson heard argument on the motion for
contempt and on the injunction. He reserved judgment, but the in-
junction remained in force. 2 In police court, matters became more
complicated. One of the complainants, James Jenkins, identified two
other men present in the courtroom who, he alleged, also participated
in the intimidation. The two, Robert Tyndall and Charles Turner, were
promptly taken into custody and required to plead to the same charges
lodged against McCord and Leach. Tyndall and Turner elected to be
tried summarily, but McCord and Leach chose trial by jury. 3 The effect
of this was that accused were to be treated as if they were charged with
an indictable offense. The magistrate ruled that all four would have to
be dealt with in this way and heard testimony to determine whether
there was sufficient evidence to commit the accused for trial. In the
result, Tyndall and Turner were discharged while McCord and Leach
were committed to trial at the next Quarter Sessions of the Peace. 4
49. Hynes v. Fisher (McCord and Jenkins); Mail, November 17, 1883, p. 12, col. 2;
ibid., November 21, 1883, p. 8, col. 1; Globe, November 21, 1883, p. 6, col. 2.
50. Mail, November 20, 1883, p. 8, col. 2. Also see Globe, November 20, 1883, p.
6, col. 2 for an account of a successful interception of a worker from Stratford brought
in by Mr. Hynes.
51. The Maifs report of this incident concluded with the observation that, "This
hostile action on the part of the masters will no doubt create a bitter feeling between
the contesting parties and make it all the harder to mend matters when the time comes
for a settlement:' November 22, 1883, p. 8, col. 2. Earlier, the OPA sought and obtained
the support of the TTLC. TTLC, Minutes, November 16, 1883; Globe, November 17,
1883, p. 14, col. 5.
52. Globe, November 23, 1883, p. 6, col. 6.
53. One of the objections of trade unionists to the CLAA passed in 1872 was that
it exposed workers to trial by police court magistrates who were perceived to be anti-
union. The 1876 reforms gave workers the right to elect trial by jury in a higher court.
S.C. 1876, c. 37, s. 3.
54. Mail, November 24, 1883, p. 12, cols. 2-3. The information and notes of the
testimony before the police magistrate can be found in Criminal Assize Indictments,
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Still, the union continued its efforts to keep replacements from taking
their jobs. A worker brought in by Mr. Ward, the contractor whose
actions had triggered the strike was "persuaded" to return to Guelph
and other incoming strikebreakers were intercepted by the strikers."
Wilson delivered his decision in both the injunction and contempt
matters on December 4. He found that the union members had "by
threats, intimidation or other unlawful means, compelled or induced"
Moriarity to give up his contract of service. In reaching this conclusion,
Wilson relied on his understanding that in such disputes, it was "the
object of each party to compel the other to yield" and that for the
union to succeed, it must prevent the masters from hiring replacement
workers. "This is the line of warfare so plainly marked out, and so
obviously the most effective that can be adopted that it is idle to say
it is not followed, nor intended to be followed by the workmen in such
a contest*"' This finding, however, did not conclude the matter. Juris-
diction to grant an injunction depended on the existence of an interest
which the court would protect against illegal conduct. The most tra-
ditional view was that only property interests warranted such protection.
Wilson rejected this approach. He surveyed recent English case law,
including Springhead and Knott, and concluded that a different position
was beginning to emerge. "From these cases the conclusion is... that
any act done or threatened to be done, injurious to trade or property
will be restrained.'" In any event, Wilson was prepared to find that,
"the business of a tradesman must be property.""
Once he determined that the court had jurisdiction, Wilson considered
whether the court should exercise its discretion to grant the relief sought.
If the plaintiff did not come to the court with "clean hands," the court
could refuse to provide a remedy. Thus, his focus shifted onto the
conduct of the masters. According to Wilson, the men who had refused
to continue to work for Ward had "a perfect right to do so.'" The
masters had acted unjustly and indefensibly in blacklisting the men.
"The masters made that which was a workshop squabble a matter of
trade war, and the subject one of class strife. They aggravated the
difficulty by arraying masters against men, with all the accompanying
York County, Case Files, Ontario Archives (OA), RG 22, Series 392, Box 228, R. v.
Leach and McCord.
55. Globe, November 23, 1883, p. 6, col. 6; ibid., November 27, 1883, p. 6, col. 2;
ibid., November 29, 1883, p. 6, col. 1; Mail, November 30, 1883, p. 8, col. 2.
56. Hynes v. Fisher, 70.
57. Ibid., 73 (my emphasis).
58. Ibid.,.74.
59. Ibid., 74.
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bitterness, resentment, ill feeling, and determination for victory engen-
dered in such a contest; and they provoked the strike which followed
their ill-judged act." Although the masters had not used violence, they
had, in Wilson's view, "used a very effectual means, and quite sufficient
power to answer their purpose'" Moreover, he equated the conduct of
the masters with that of the union. "To say that a fine is not a pressure
in the nature of intimidation and force as powerful at times as physical
force threatened or actual, is to disregard the ordinary experiences of
life."6° In the result, Wilson blamed both parties, refused to continue
the injunction, and urged them to settle their differences.
On the contempt motion, Wilson found that McCord and Jenkins
had knowledge of the injunction and, therefore, were bound by its
terms. He also found that they hindered and molested Pickard, a mem-
ber of the MPA, to prevent him from hiring replacement workers. This
was done as part of a scheme devised and systematically followed by
the members of the OPA. Yet, despite these findings, Wilson dismissed
the motion to commit on a technicality. The injunction had been sought
and obtained by the plaintiffs in their personal capacity, not as repre-
sentatives of all members of the MPA. Pickard was not a named plaintiff
in the action and it could not be maintained that McCord and Jenkins
had "done any act against the plaintiffs personally by their interference
with Pickard."'
This left the matter of the criminal charges against Leach and McCord.
The York General Quarter Sessions of the Peace convened in early
December. Leach and McCord were indicted on four counts under the
1876 statute, including using violence, intimidation by using threats of
violence, persistently following, and besetting the home and place of
work of the replacement workers. In total, nine witnesses were called
and the trial lasted for more than a day. After four hours of deliberation,
the jury returned without a unanimous verdict. Ten favored conviction
while two favored acquittal. As a result, the accused were released on
bail and a new trial was scheduled for the next criminal assizes.62
The strike dragged on and employers continued to bring men in while
the union attempted to intercept them. Throughout the strike, the
plasterers received substantial financial support from other unions, per-
haps exceeding one thousand dollars, including two hundred dollars
from the TTLC to help pay legal expenses. After the legal actions were
60. Ibid., 75-76.
61. Hynes v. Fisher (McCord and Jenkins), 93.
62. Mail, December 8, 1883, p. 12, col. 6; ibid., December 11, p. 8, col. 2; December
12, p. 8, col. 1; R. v. Leach and McCord.
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disposed, the TTLC also appointed a committee to approach the MPA
to see if a settlement could be arranged.63 In mid-December, negotiations
between the OPA and the MPA resumed but no agreement was reached
by the end of the year.64
Leach and McCord were tried at the Criminal Assizes on January
26, 1884. Aemelius Irving, a prominent Toronto lawyer, appeared for
the Crown. Again, numerous witnesses were called by both parties, but
this time the jury found Leach guilty on all counts except using violence
and McCord guilty of persistently following and watching and besetting.
They were fined fifty dollars each by Judge Rose. The fines were paid
immediately.65 This brought to an end all the legal proceedings,66 but
not the strike. It was not settled until March, 1884, on undisclosed
terms.
67
From a technical standpoint, the MPA's legal strategy succeeded in
almost all respects. They obtained an ex parte injunction from the
courts within a day of their application, solely on the basis of their
affidavits.68 From that point on, delay worked in their favor as the union
was under a judicial order not to engage in certain activities. It took
nearly a month to get the injunction lifted. As well, Wilson's judgment
made interference with the right to trade enjoinable, because it was an
independently protected legal interest, a new species of property, or
both. Legal recognition of a right to trade was an important victory for
employers because it provided justification for imposing a broad range
of correlative duties on workers that went well beyond those imposed
by statute. Finally, the case demonstrated that an injunction could be
63. TTLC, Minutes, December 7, 1883; Globe, December 10, 1883, p. 6, cols. 1-2.
There was some resistance to making this grant and, as an alternative, it was suggested
that the TTLC should appoint a committee to solicit unions in the city to pay the
plasterers' expenses.
64. Globe, December 17, 1883, p. 6, col. 1; ibid., December 19, 1883, p. 6, col. 2;
ibid., December 20, 1883, p. 6, col. i; ibid., December 27, 1883, p. 6, col. 1; TTLC,
Minutes, December 21, 1883.
65. Mail, January 28, 1883, p. 5, col. 5; ibid., January 29, p. 8, col. 1; Criminal Assize
Minutes, York Assizes, Winter 1884, OA, RG 22, (unprocessed records), pp. 347, 357-
58, 360.
66. The MPA never pursued the damage action, suggesting that its real object was
to obtain the injunction.
67. TTLC, Minutes, March 21, 1884.
68. Fusion of law and equity had been achieved in Ontario by the Judicature Act,
S.O. 1881, c. 5. This overcame many of the remedial problems caused by divided
jurisdiction. On these developments, see Paul Romney, Mr Attorney (Toronto, 1986),
286-90; Margaret A. Banks, "The Evolution of the Ontario Courts 1788-1981" in Essays
in the History of Canadian Law, vol. 2, ed. David Flaherty (Toronto, 1983), 518-25.
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drawn in terms that would make it binding on all members of a union
who had knowledge of it, and knowledge was likely to be inferred from
the circumstances. In addition, the action could be brought in a rep-
resentative form that would protect all members of an employers' as-
sociation, even though the court ruled that, in this case, the plaintiffs
had failed to do so.
Clearly, then, the judgment put powerful legal tools into the hands
of employers, even while the judge chastised this particular group of
employers for the tactics they adopted. The importance of this was
recognized by the Canadian Manufacturer, a journal associated with
the Canadian Manufacturers' Association, in an editorial on the case
which concluded: "This is by far the most important legal decision with
regard to strikes yet given in Canada, and will no doubt be pushed to
its legitimate conclusion. It may yet revolutionize the whole system of
strikes and intimidation in vogue."69
Yet, ultimately, the MPA's legal strategy failed and the Canadian
Manufacturer's hopeful prediction did not come true. Not only did the
MPA lose in court, but, even while the injunction was in force, it did
not alter the union's tactics. Incoming recruits continued to be inter-
cepted and scabs continued to be pressured. Moreover, the police were
not called upon to enforce vigorously the terms of the injunction. Even
the motion for contempt and the criminal charge did not break the
union's will to resist.
Canadian employers did not flock to the courts to obtain civil in-
junctions against trade unions until after 1900.70 In comparison, Amer-
ican employers during this period became active users of the injunction.
There, the first civil injunctions were issued against striking railway
workers in 1877 and were used increasingly by employers in the fol-
lowing decades.7' Why Canadian employers did not follow the example
of their American counterparts is a question to which we will return
in the concluding discussion.
Law and the "Great Uprising" in Toronto, 1886
Eighteen-eighty-six was a memorable year in North American labor
history. In the United States, labor strife reached new heights, culmi-
69. Canadian Manufacturer December 14, 1883, p. 918.
70. The only other nineteenth-century injunction identified to date was obtained by
the publisher of the Toronto World in 1888 to restrain publication of a boycott notice
by the Toronto Typographical Union, No. 91. It attracted almost no attention and, like
the Hynes case, was not emulated by other employers facing similar difficulties. See
Table 1.
71. See Forbath, Law and the Shaping, 66-79; 193-98.
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nating in the Haymarket riot in which eleven people died and nearly
one hundred others were injured. In Ontario, not only were there a
record number of strikes, but they were more often conducted by semi-
skilled workers against larger employers. Unable to depend on a partial
monopoly of skill and lacking a tradition of craft solidarity, these workers
adopted different tactics, including mass picketing, to discourage re-
placements. Employers and state officials committed to maintaining
"public order" and the right to do business were particularly concerned
by the involvement of large working-class crowds.72
Earlier confrontations between unskilled and the authorities presaged
the events of 1886. For example, when the Grand Trunk Railway's
(GTR) freight handlers in Toronto struck in the spring of 1882, a large
police contingent, including the GTR's own security force, was dis-
patched to protect replacement workers. The TTLC censured the police
authorities for allowing the force to be used as "an engine of intimidation
against the men on strike. "'I
Two disputes in Toronto in 1886 exemplified this newer context of
industrial conflict. The first was the strike against Toronto's largest
factory, the Massey agricultural implements works. On February 8,
between 250-400 of Massey's 700 employees, most of whom were
laborers, walked out in protest after five leaders of the factory's Knights
of Labor local were discharged. The striking workers were greeted by
a large contingent of city police dispatched to protect the factory. The
next day, a procession of workers protested this display of force. The
leaders of the Knights guaranteed there would be no violence or damage
to property and Mayor Howland, who recently had been elected with
the Knights' support, promised to intervene. The following day the
force was removed. The Police Commissioners met that afternoon and
decided that they could not accept a check for one hundred dollars sent
by the Massey Company to the Police Benefit Fund "in consideration
of the services rendered by the Department at the strike." The com-
missioners thanked Massey for its kind intentions but stated that to
accept the donation "might create a precedent that was not in accord
with the rules and regulations of the Force. 7"
The peaceful tactics of the strikers helped sustain community support
72. Jeremy Brecher, Strike! (Boston, 1972), 31-50; Paul Avrich, The Haymarket
Tragedy (Princeton, 1984) (United States); Palmer, "Labour Protest;' 73-75 (Ontario).
73. Globe, April 8, 1882, p. 10, col. 3. For accounts of the event, see Mail, April 6,
1882, p. 8, cols. 4-5; ibid., April 7, 1882, p. 8, col. 4; ibid., April 8, 1882, p. 2, col. 4;
ibid., April 10, 1882, p. 2, cols. 1-2; ibid., April 12, 1882, p. 8, col. 3.
74. Toronto Board of Police Commissioners, Minutes, February 10, 1886. For a general
account of the strike, see Kealey, Toronto Workers, 196-99.
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for their cause. One newspaper wrote, "The strikers, so long as they
conduct themselves in a peaceable and orderly manner, as we have no
doubt they will, are entitled to the sympathy and support of the com-
munity in the position they have taken."'75 When the skilled molders
and tool-room machinists joined the strike, Massey acceded to the
workers' demands.
The second dispute involved the Toronto Street Railway Company
(TSR). The strike has been described in detail elsewhere and so the
focus here is on the role of the police and the courts.76 The dispute was
caused by the TSR's requirement that all employees sign the "ironclad,"
a contract that prohibited union membership. When the TSR heard
that some of its men joined the Knights, it moved to fire those involved.
Cabmen arriving at work on Wednesday morning, March 10, 1886,
found a cluster of police gathered outside and the assignment boards
blank. They were called individually to take out carts, but most refused.
Later that morning as the stable hands arrived, the cabmen attempted
to persuade them to join the strike. Mathew Maloney, one of the cabmen
actively engaged in this action, was identified as a ringleader by Edward
Franklin, the superintendent of the TSR. At his suggestion, Major Frank
Draper, the Chief of Police who was present at the scene, sent one of
his officers to arrest Maloney.77 Later that morning, nearly three hundred
striking workers marched to the Knights of Labor headquarters and
remained there most of the day, taking little or no part in the ensuing
actions on the street.
A large crowd, numbering in the thousands, gathered in support of
the strikers. The few cars that were sent out did not make much progress.
Teamsters blocked their way and the non-union drivers were taunted
with shouts of "scab" and "rat." In one case, people in the crowd
unhitched the horses and led them back to the stables. In another, a
car that had been mounted by two police officers was seized, pushed
by the crowd, and later abandoned. No further arrests, however, were
made that day. By the late afternoon, the TSR gave up its efforts to
maintain any service.
The following day, the TSR renewed its efforts to dispatch whatever
cars it could with the workers who remained behind and the newly
75. News, February 9, 1886, p. 2, col. 2.
76. See Desmond Morton, Mayor Howland (Toronto, 1973), 44-56; Kealey, Toronto
Workers, 200-209; David Frank, "Trouble in Toronto: The Street Railway Lockout and
Strike, 1886" (unpublished).
77. The account of the arrest is derived from the testimony of Draper and Franklin
given before Police Magistrate Denison on March 19 and 22, 1883. York Criminal
Assize Files, OA, RG 22, Series 392, Box 237, R. v. Maloney.
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recruited ones. Again, the way was blocked by large crowds and coal
wagons placed on the tracks. The striking TSR workers, however, con-
tinued to maintain a low profile, for which they were complimented.
The mood of the crowd was less jovial than it had been the day before.
Some people threw frozen mud, ice and stones at the cars and the
police. The police response was moderate. Two young boys who had
been employed as stable hands, John Landers, aged 13, and James
Ryan, aged 12, were arrested for pelting the crowd and police, but little
effort was made to beat back the crowds."8 Again, the TSR abandoned
its effort to maintain service.
In the meantime, both the union and the employer were complaining
about the local authorities' handling of the strike. A deputation of
Knights met with Chief Draper on Wednesday and with Mayor Howland
on Thursday. They objected to the assignment of additional officers to
protect the company's property and to the arrest of Maloney. They also
demanded that the city take action against the TSR because it was in
breach of its duty to provide service. Draper promised to act as fairly
as possible between the parties79 while Howland expressed sympathy
with the men's cause, but advised them to behave in an orderly manner.
"Let there be no disturbance or injury of property" he warned. "I cannot
stand for one moment between any of you and the law."8 Senator Frank
Smith, the owner of the TSR, complained about the lack of police
protection and threatened to bring an action against the city for damages.
Howland responded by threatening to hold the TSR liable for not
fulfilling its obligations to the city under its charter and for any injuries
arising out of the disturbance. He blamed Smith for the trouble because
of the TSR's interference with the legal liberty of their employees to
join a trade union."s
Sympathy for the cause of the union did not, however, extend to the
street disturbances. On Thursday, Mathew Maloney was arraigned be-
fore Denison, charged with conducting himself in a disorderly manner.
A motion by N. G. Bigelow, Maloney's lawyer, to have the charges
dismissed on a technicality was refused because, in Denison's view, if
the accused had been disorderly, he should be punished. Bigelow's ob-
jections and legal arguments mattered little to Denison, an arrogant
man who saw it as his duty and right to administer substantive justice
according to his own views and intuitions, rather than on the basis of
78. News, March 11, 1886, p. 4, col. 2; World, March 12, 1886, p. 5, col. 5.
79. Mail, March 11, 1886, p. 2, col. 1.
80. World, March 11, 1886, p. 1, col. 1; News, March 11, 1886, p. 4, cols. 2-4.
81. World, March 12, 1886, p. 5, col. 4.
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law and evidence.12 Before adjourning the case so that prosecution
witnesses could be secured, Denison made it clear that "it is necessary
that the police should disperse the mobs on the streets in order that
citizens may be able to go peaceably to their occupations."' 3
At the meeting of the police commissioners on Thursday afternoon,
Mr. Shipley, solicitor for the TSR, complained about the lack of police
protection. A unanimous board ordered the police chief to dispatch
such force as might be necessary the following morning to enable op-
erations to resume. 4 Following the meeting, Senator Smith told re-
porters that the Police Commission actually had taken control of the
operation of the railway until the difficulties were over." The World
strongly supported the commissioners' decision. "The maintenance of
law and order is a far more serious matter to the city of Toronto than
a mere dispute between a concern and its men. If a crowd can rule the
street whenever it sees fit, where is it all going to end?" 6
The following morning squads of police lined the streets. When the
crowds would not yield, the officers charged with batons swinging. A
recently created unit of mounted officers assisted." Confrontations be-
tween police and the crowd continued throughout the morning, resulting
in at least nine injuries to the police and many more to people in the
crowd. At least fifteen people were arrested and charged with various
offenses including disorderly conduct, obstruction, and assault. Of those
arrested, only one, John Oakes, was a street car employee.
The Police Commission met at 1:30 that afternoon to consider the
situation. Because the officers were exhausted it was decided to withdraw
them from the streets at 3:00, but to offer protection to the TSR the
next morning. A delegation of aldermen appeared to complain about
82. Colonel George T Denison, Recollections of a Police Magistrate (Toronto, 1920),
9-13. Denison was also a racist. See chapter 8, entitled "The Negro Element:' Also see
Gene Howard Homel, "Denison's Law: Criminal Justice and the Police Court in To-
ronto, 1877-1921,' Ontario History 73 (1981): 176; David Gagan, The Denison Family
of Toronto (Toronto, 1972), 44-92. Denison's informal approach was not uncommon
among the lower rungs of the judiciary and reflected an older model of urban justice
in which maintaining public order took priority over the determination of individual
rights. Philip Girard, "The Rise and Fall of Urban Justice in Halifax, 1815-1886;' Nova
Scotia Historical Review 8(2) (1988).
83. News, March I1, 1886, p. 4, col. 4.
84. Toronto Board of Police Commissioners, Minutes, March I1, 1886.
85. Globe, March 12, 1886, p. 8, col. 3.
86. World, March 12, 1886, p. 2, col. 1.
87. It is unclear what role, if any, Denison played in the unit's creation, but it is
noteworthy that he was an army officer and the author of a book on cavalry tactics.
See Gagan, Denison Family, 45-52.
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the assertion made by Smith that the board had taken over the oper-
ations of the railway. The commissioners firmly denied they had agreed
to such an arrangement and Judge McDougall, the chair of the board,
drafted an angry letter to Smith. "I must disclaim any intention on the
part of the Board to assume any greater responsibility or control over
your affairs than over the affairs of any other Citizen who complains
of being interrupted in the enjoyment of his civil rights by force and
violence. We will endeavour to protect your company and all other
ratepayers who properly make claims upon the Police for protection.""8
The last item of business was the question of whether it was necessary
to swear in one hundred special constables or call out the militia in
aid of the civil power. On the basis of Police Chief Draper's assessment,
the board decided not to take either of these measures, but indicated
that it would not hesitate to do so if the circumstances required it. After
the meeting adjourned, Mayor Howland issued a proclamation calling
upon the citizens of Toronto to give free passage to the cars of the TSR
and not to assemble or congregate in crowds in the streets on which
the lines ran. The proclamation warned them that anyone caught in-
terfering would be prosecuted according to the law. 9
That same afternoon, a number of aldermen arranged a settlement
under which the TSR agreed to take back all the men. Although it
appeared to some as if the TSR had unconditionally surrendered, the
question of whether the workers would be allowed to join a union was
not clearly resolved. This would soon lead to a second strike in May.
In the days that followed, Denison dealt harshly with the men who
had been arrested. He found most guilty and imposed substantial fines,
ranging from twenty to thirty dollars. His message was clear. "The peace
of the city must be preserved at any cost. No organization would be
allowed to establish mob law as long as there was an officer of the peace
in the Dominion " '9 Mathew Maloney was singled out for special treat-
ment. Initially charged with disorderly conduct, when Maloney was
brought before Denison on the Monday after the strike was settled, the
charge was changed to intimidation, an indictable offense. When Ma-
loney's lawyer objected to the indictment because it failed to identify
the persons who were the alleged targets of his misconduct, Denison
88. Toronto Board of Police Commissioners, Minutes, March 12, 1886.
89. News, March 13, 1886, p. 3, col. 4. Judge McDougall also informed the press
that he was determined to demonstrate that mob rule would not be tolerated. World,
March, 13, 1886, p. 1, col. 4.
90. Mail, March 15, 1886, p. 8, col. 2.
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granted another adjournment to permit an amendment."' Evidence on
the amended indictments was subsequently heard and Denison com-
mitted Maloney to trial. He was freed on one hundred dollars bail.92
Denison's antipathy toward the strike, and especially the street actions
in support of it, was shared by at least two Ontario Supreme Court
judges. Chief Justice Cameron opened the Napanee assizes on Monday,
March 15. In his address to the grand jury, Cameron turned his attention
to the recent events in Toronto. He noted that the TSR had felt that
it was in its interests not to hire anyone who was a member of a "trades
union or labor organization which interferes with the individual liberty
of men themselves." Perhaps the company exhibited a "want of dis-
cretion" in summarily dismissing the men who violated their agreement
but, in Cameron's view, "they acted within the right that the law gave
them: because, I presume, there is nothing clearer to the mind of any
man of common sense than that every man ... can make just such
bargain as he pleases. .. ." While recognizing that workers could agree
among themselves not to work except under certain conditions, Cam-
eron regretted that, "unfortunately they do not stop there, and when
they are exercising that undesirable right they generally go beyond that
91. Globe, March 16, 1886, p. 8, col. 4.
92. R. v. Maloney; News, March 22, 1886, p. 4, col. 2.
302 Law and History Review
limit and interfere with and infringe upon the rights of others and they
do wrong and overstep their privilege, and that is the danger there is
to the community in these organizations." The grand jury, in its pre-
sentment, concurred with Cameron's view that "stringent legislation
should be provided for the prevention of labor strikes and the injury
to the public interests relating therefrom."93 Cameron made similar
remarks at the Frontenac assizes in Kingston the following Monday.94
Justice Gait also commented publicly on the events in Toronto at
the opening of the York assize at which Maloney's case was to be heard.
Galt agreed that workers had the right to join trade unions for the
purpose of agreeing on wages, but warned that "they must not attempt
to force others into doing as they wish, nor must they use any obstruction
or follow other workmen around for the purpose of intimidation. There
were instances of this during the late car troubles, and it was a perfect
disgrace to the city to see cars filled with policemen to enable the
company to run their cars. 9  Despite these comments, the grand jury
refused to indict, presumably because they did not think there was
sufficient evidence to bring the case to trial.96
A rather unusual debate over the propriety of these grand jury ad-
dresses ensued.97 The News thought Cameron's address to the Napanee
assize was "a little too much like making a stump speech."9" Cameron
took the unusual step of responding to the criticism in his opening
address to the Kingston assizes the following week. He suggested that
the News was "perhaps ignorant of the functions of a judge, and the
subjects on which he had a right to express an opinion."99 The News
subsequently denied they were questioning his right to express himself
"on any conceivable subject upon which he sees fit to dilate in his
charges... ." However, when a judge "advances views which are biased
or unsound, the press has the right of comment and criticism."" None
of this deterred Cameron who continued to express his views to grand
juries at various stops during the spring assizes."'
93. World, March 16, 1886, p. 1, col. 8. For a more abbreviated and slightly different
account of Cameron's comments see Napanee Standard, March 19, 1886, p. 3, col. 3.
94. Globe, March 23, 1886, p. 2, col. 4.
95. News, April 21, 1886, p. 4, col. 4.
96. R. v. Maloney; Globe, April 22, 1886, p. 8, col. 1.
97. On the practice and content of grand jury addresses in Ontario from 1830-60,
see Patrick Brode, "Grand Jury Addresses of the Early Canadian Judges in an Age of
Reform," Law Society Gazette 23 (1989).
98. News, March 18, 1886, p. 2, col. 2.
99. As cited in News, March 25, 1886, p. 2, col. I.
100. Ibid.
101. For example, James R. Brown, chair of the Legislative Committee of the Oshawa
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The Canadian Law Times was more circumspect in its comments.
Referring generally to grand jury addresses during the spring assizes, it
noted that, "a great many subjects have been placed before [juries],
upon which they have been asked their opinions -not a little, we fancy,
to their astonishment. A juryman might well be surprised to be asked
by a Judge what he thought of the relations of capital and labour.. ""2
Editorial opinion, although by no means unanimous, was generally
sympathetic to the strikers' cause but strongly against violence.' °3 Even
the News, which provided the most favorable coverage of the strike,
consistently warned that violence and disorder would alienate public
opinion."4 Indeed, a cartoon (see figure 2) published by the Grip a
Trades and Labour Council-and future factory inspector-critically reported upon
Cameron's charge to the grand jury at Whitby. See News, May 15, 1886, p. 6, col. 3.
102. Canadian Law Times 6 (1886): 284-85.
103. For example, see Hamilton Spectator, March 6, 1886, p. 2, col. 1; ibid., March
12, 1886, p. 2, col. 1; World, March 12, 1886, p. 2, col. 1; Monetary Times, March 19,
1886, p. 1068. Canadian Manufacturer, March 19, 1886, p. 163, expressed particular
foreboding about the involvement of the Knights because they were trying "to bring
about a general combination of the trade. What it all is to end in no one can foresee:'
104. "Nothing is won by violence; be good-natured and steady, and the victory is
with those who have right on their side." News, March 12, 1886, cited in Frank,
"Troublz' 35.
IS 70ktLL kkMEfS
KKJA 41 QQaktfELI'S" .. -
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month after the events (and with an eye on events in the United States)
perhaps best captured this sentiment. 5
Leaders of the strike were careful to distance themselves from the
action on the streets and emphasized that it was not the strikers or the
Knights of Labor who were directly responsible for the disorder. Yet,
they objected to the strong police presence because of the implication
that the strikers were likely to be violent and disorderly. The Knights
lodged formal protests against the use of force on the last day of the
strike, when the police waded into the crowds swinging their clubs and
charging on horseback." The two labor newspapers published at the
time, both associated with the Knights of Labor, also expressed a dif-
ferent perspective than that of the mainstream media. The Palladium
of Labor did not cover the strike itself, but Phillips Thompson, a lawyer
turned journalist writing under the nom de plume Enjolras, wrote two
columns in April in which he reflected upon the broader implications
of these events." 7 In the first, Thompson addressed the question of
responsibility for the disturbances and the reaction of the state.
Put the responsibility where it belongs. Whenever there is long continued
and deep-seated injustice-wherever human rights are defied and tram-
pled upon, there will be aroused a spirit of resistance which sometimes
may overpass its legitimate bounds and find vent in actions which no
reasonable or humane man can approve.... But we do say that however
misled or inconsiderate or even criminal some actions done in the heat
of the conflict between Labor and capitalism may be, the responsibility
for those actions rests on the individuals, and the system which provoked
them.
Thompson denounced "unjust judges, such as Cameron and Denison"
105. Earlier, Grip, April 3, 1886, p. 3, endorsed Powderly's call to the Knights not
to strike without proper authorization. Referring to his threat to resign unless the practice
stopped, the Grip quipped, "If Powderly goes off, it will probably blow up the whole
concern:'
106. The Police Board found no fault with the conduct of the men. Indeed, they
authorized Chief Draper to grant members of the force two days leave each in recognition
of their special service. The Board also endorsed Chief Draper's tactics. Toronto Board
of Police Commissioners, Minutes, March 16, 1886; Globe, March 18, 1886, p. 8, col.
1; TTLC, Minutes, March 19, 1886.
107. Thompson began his career as a police court reporter for the Telegram and
worked as reporter for the News during the TSR strike. See Russell Hann, "Brainworkers
and the Knights of Labor: E. E. Sheppard, Phillips Thompson, and the Toronto News,
1883-1887;' in Essays in Canadian Working Class History, ed. Gregory S. Kealey and
Peter Warrian (Toronto, 1976), 35; Jay Atherton, "Introduction" in Phillips Thompson,
The Politics of Labor (1887; reprint Toronto, 1975); Ramsay Cook, The Regenerators
(Toronto, 1985), 152-73.
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for throwing blame upon the workers while failing to denounce the
"tyrannical course of the monopolists.... [T]hey clearly show bias in
favor of wealth and social position. .. ." Mayor Howland, by way of
contrast, was complimented because he "looked... behind the great
street mob who violated the letter of the law.. ." and saw "a swollen
corporation who violated the spirit of justice." In Thompson's view,
"the despot and oppressor.., have force and law on their side.. ."
while "capitalists and the pampered, overpaid officials.., would place
the courts, the police, the militia, all at the service of capitalism ... to
coerce and punish the toiler when he has been driven into an attitude
of resistance."" 8
Two weeks later, Thompson published a more general critique of the
legal system. Jury verdicts based on the real merits of the case were
defeated on points of law, and democratic legislation was stymied by
the judges through their "power to twist the plain intention of the
legislators into the very opposite.' He virtually dared the judges to cite
him for contempt. Their background as lawyers meant they were men
"whose minds are trained in a narrow groove.., and who are accus-
tomed to hire out their glib tongues to plead any case without regard
to its justice." They became judges not because of their professional
merit, but in reward for faithful service to the governing party. To remedy
this, Thompson advocated the election of judges for fixed terms of
office. "Then, perhaps, we should have less of that evident bias to the
side of power and authority-less subserviancy to the wealthy and
influential than are now sometimes observable in the occupants of our
judicial positions."'0 9
A second labor paper, the Canadian Labor Reformer, did not begin
publishing in Toronto until after the strike. When, however, some months
later Denison requested that his salary be increased from thirty-five
hundred to four thousand dollars, his conduct during the TSR strike
came under fire. It was alleged that he would have called out the militia
but for restraining influence of Mayor Howland and that his disposition
of the strike-related cases "left the impression on the minds of many
that he was not above using the power his position gave him for the
purpose of crushing the labor movement.""o The paper also published
108. Palladium of Labor April 3, 1886, p. 1, cols. 1-3.
109. Ibid., April 17, 1886, p. 1, col. 1-4.
110. Canadian Labor Reformer July 31, 1886, p. 6. Later, in the context of a debate
over private police, the paper complained that the Board of Police Commissioners was
not accountable to the people because only one of its three members was elected. Ibid.,
October 30, 1886, p. 3-4.
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a comment by James R. Brown, chair of the legislative committee of
the Oshawa Trades and Labour Council, criticizing the judges who,
instead of declaring that ironclads violated the law against slavery, fined
workers who protested against it for interfering with the liberty of the
subject. "That is the working of that wonderful thing called law.""'
Workers' perceptions of the law and its role in these events are harder
to decipher. The strikers were kept away from the disturbances by their
leaders. Yet, according to one Knight interviewed by the Globe, "had
these men been left to follow the bent of their own inclinations under
the aggravated circumstances forced on them by the company, dis-
agreeable results might have ensured." ' 2 The actions of the thousands
of people who gathered in the streets during the three days of the strike
perhaps is the best evidence of popular attitudes that we have. Drawing
on the work of E. P. Thompson, David Frank argued that the "moral
economy" of the Toronto working-class crowd included support for the
right of the workers to join a union, scorn for scab workers, and anger
directed at the TSR for breaching its public trust by locking out its
employees." 3 Clearly, the crowd also demonstrated a willingness to
breach the peace and defy the authorities, to at least a limited extent,
but generally avoided serious violence.
In sum, workers acting in solidarity with the strikers were prepared
to break the law in support of what they believed was a just struggle.
Labor leaders were wary of such activity, but they were prepared to
explain it as a response to injustice. Labor journalists and intellectuals
articulated a wide-ranging critique of the legal system and, in particular,
the judiciary. Law and justice diverged substantially when it came to
class issues. Moreover, law itself was understood not as a unitary system.
Rather, a distinction was drawn between democratic law (the law of
the jury and the legislature) and undemocratic law (the law of politically
unaccountable judges and police commissioners, a majority of whom
were judges). Democratic law could produce substantive justice while
the law of the judges protected and reproduced class rule. It followed
that reformers should struggle to establish more democratic law and
legal and police administration.
111. Ibid., July 31, 1886, p. 10. In another article discussing a recent pronouncement
by an American judge on the illegality of boycotting, the author, Victor Drury, a prom-
inent member of the Knights in New York, asserted that some Canadian judges held
similar views. He asked rhetorically, "Are judges impartial administrators of equal and
impartial justice? or are they officials appointed to maintain class supremacy?" Ibid.,
May 29, 1886, p. 6.
112. Globe, March 12, 1886, p. 8, col. 4.
113. David Frank, "Trouble in Toronto:' 48.
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By May the illusory nature of the settlement became apparent as
Smith resumed firing employees who joined the Knights and required
new hires to sign the ironclad. In response, the TSR workers struck.
This time the authorities made it clear from the outset that disorder
would not be tolerated. Mayor Howland issued a proclamation forbid-
ding gatherings on the street during the strike and a strong police
presence was immediately established.1 14 The police were quick to arrest
those who interfered with the operation of the street cars or who just
called the drivers "rats," and Denison meted out harsh penalties to those
brought before him." 5
Although trade union leaders and the labor press denounced this
repressive turn, 6 they too seemed anxious to avoid a repetition of the
street actions and adopted a strategy that reduced the chance of physical
confrontation. They established a cooperative bus service, owned and
operated by the strikers, and urged the public to boycott the TSR. This,
however, was only partially successful in avoiding conflict and ultimately
failed to bring the TSR to accept the union. Sporadic outbursts of
violence continued. The most serious incident occurred during a proces-
sion of strikers and their supporters escorting buses that had arrived
from Kingston for the cooperative. Violence erupted when the proces-
sion encountered TSR cars driven by scabs. Rocks were thrown and
windows were smashed. Despite efforts by the union executive to stop
the outburst, an estimated thirty to forty TSR cars were damaged before
order was restored. 7
The most likely explanation for the increased concern of both public
114. World, May 10, 1886, p. 1, col. 1.
115. At least nineteen people were arrested in the early days of the strike. Fines
ranged from one to thirty dollars. See, World, May 13, 1886, p. 1, col. 5; ibid., May
14, 1886, p. 1, col. 3; ibid., May 15, 1886, p. 1, col. 1; News, May 10, 1886, p. 4, col.
4; ibid., June 3, 1886, p. 4, col. 4.
116. D. J. O'Donoghue, a leader of the Knights, denounced Denison and the Police
Commission for their actions at a public meeting in St. Lawrence Hall, World, May
20, 1886, p. 1, col. 4; the TTLC condemned the excessive fines meted out by Denison
and complained to the Attorney General, TTLC, Minutes, May 21, 1886; the Canadian
Labor Reformer May 29, 1886, p. 9, parodied Denison by reporting an apocryphal case
in which a horse that stopped on a street car line was threatened with arrest and told
it would be fined twenty to thirty dollars for obstruction. In a more serious vein, the
paper cautioned, "[I]awlessness never did good to any cause, and the gamins and others
who threw stones at the cars couldn't well employ themselves in a way more harmful
to the cause of the men."
117. Mail, May 26, 1886, p. 8, col. 3; ibid., May 27, 1886, p. 8, col. 2; ibid., May
28, 1886, p. 8, col. 1. On the failure of the strike, see Kealey, Toronto Workers, 208-
10 and Gregory S. Kealey and Bryan D. Palmer, Dreaming of What Might Be (Toronto,
1987), 122-26.
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officials and trade unions leaders over violence was the events in Chicago
at the beginning of the month. Police fired on striking workers at the
McCormick factory on May 3, killing four and wounding many others.
The following day, a bomb was tossed at a contingent of police sent to
break up an anarchist rally being held in Haymarket Square, killing
one officer instantly and injuring fatally seven more. The police opened
fire, wounding at least sixty fellow officers, killing seven or eight in the
crowd, and wounding thirty or forty more." ' This concern was made
explicit by Judge McDougall in his charge to the grand jury at the
opening of the General Sessions of the Peace in Toronto on May 11.
After reviewing the law regarding strikes and lockouts, he warned, "For
the safety of society it was necessary that the law should be en-
forced.... The civilized world had been shocked by the action of the
strikers in Chicago, and although he had no fear that such things would
ever happen in Canada, yet it was evidence of what might occur if the
laws were not rigidly enforced."" 9
Boycotts and Conflict in the Hamilton Building Trade, 1888
Although the word "boycott" was first coined in 1880, the practice
of cutting off social and economic relations with people who violated
community norms was not. The source of the word, and the immediate
inspiration for the use of the tactic by labor in the 1880s, derived from
the struggles between Irish tenants and their landlords. These struggles
were supported by the Land League, which enjoyed a large following
among Irish immigrants in North America, many of whom were actively
involved in local labor organizations. 20 Some of the leading labor re-
formers in Toronto, including Daniel O'Donoghue, Phillips Thompson,
and A. W. Wright, were members of the League's local branch. 2'
Boycotting was attractive to labor organizations in the 1880s because
it was perceived to meet a current need. The effectiveness of strikes
and picketing was limited, especially in industries that did not rely on
relatively small pools of artisan labor. Physically obstructing or inter-
fering with scab labor or damaging employers' property were not only
118. The most thorough account of these events is Averich, Haymarket Tragedy,
chap. 14. Recognition of the impact of Haymarket on local events is seen in the News,
May 10, 1886, p. 2, col. 1.
119. Mail, May 12, 1886, p. 8, col. 3.
120. For the Irish background and influence, see Michael A. Gordon, "The Labor
Boycott in New York City, 1880-1886;' Labor History 16 (1975) and Harry W. Laidler,
Boycotts and the Labor Struggle (1913; reprint New York, 1968), 23-26.
121. Kealey and Palmer, Dreaming, 313-16.
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illegal and likely to result in police intervention, arrests, fines, and
coercive legislation,' 22 but these tactics also lacked legitimacy in the
wider community and among large segments of the working class and
their leaders. For these and other reasons, the Knights had long favored
arbitration as an alternative to strikes, but were confronted by the
unwillingness of most employers to submit disputes to arbitration vol-
untarily and of the state to pass laws that compelled them to do so.' 23
Boycotting was attractive, because it was seen to provide an alternative
means of imposing economic pressure on employers and on other
workers who would not maintain solidarity. Moreover, it created a
mechanism through which broad community solidarity could be mo-
bilized in support of the claims of a particular group of workers. Indeed,
high levels of craft, class and community consciousness, and solidarity
were crucial to the success of boycotts. This source of strength, however,
was also a point of vulnerability, both because broader solidarity could
be difficult to build and sustain and because the involvement of "third
parties" in the dispute was alarming to many and provided ammunition
for attacks on the legality of this activity.24
Boycotting was not just an activity in which workers engaged. Em-
ployers combined to boycott workers through the creation of blacklists.
For example, after the 1882 carpenters' strike, Toronto employers re-
fused to hire Thomas Moor, one of the union's leaders. In addition, it
was the decision of the MPA to boycott members of the OPA, which,
in the words of Chief Justice Wilson, "made that which was a workshop
squabble a matter of trade war"' 25 Boycotts were also increasingly used
by capitalists in intra-class conflict during this period. Enterprises formed
associations and sought to quash competition from non-members by,
122. Confrontations in Quebec City between union and non-union dock workers in
1887 led to the hasty enactment of criminal law making it an offense to interfere with
persons working on a ship or in connection with loading or unloading it (S.C. 1887, c.
49). The law was vigorously opposed by the unions and their legislative supporters, but
without success. For an instructive look at the attitudes of the politicians, see Canada,
House of Commons, Debates, June 17, 1887, p. 1075; ibid., June 20, 1887, pp. 1153-
55; ibid., June 22, 1887, pp. 1229-33.
123. Kealey and Palmer, Dreaming, 330-39.
124. On the importance of these solidarities, see Gregory R. Zieren, "The Labor
Boycott and Class Consciousness in Toledo, Ohio:' in Life and Labor: Dimensions of
American Working-Class History, ed. Charles Stephenson and Robert Asher (Albany,
1986), 131. On the law's approach to third-party interference, see Ofen, Belated Feu-
dalism, esp. 135-144.
125. Kealey, Toronto Workers, 327 and Hynes v. Fisher, 75. For further examples,
see Canada Investigates Industrialism, ed. Gregory S. Kealey (Toronto, 1973), 134, 188-
90.
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for example, threatening to boycott suppliers who continued to have
dealings with them. Although critics were quick to point to the hypocrisy
of employers who denounced labor's use of the boycott but were silent
when they were the perpetrators, it was not until the end of decade that
analogous behavior by capital was to become an important legal and
political issue.'26
Labor boycotts took various forms. One was the consumer boycott,
which sought to pressure employers by reducing demand for their prod-
ucts. Often this tactic was used where a strike could not halt production.
It was tried in the second round of conflict with the TSR. In that case,
because the boycotted product was a monopoly service upon which
many were dependent, it was necessary to provide alternative trans-
portation if the boycott was to have a chance of success. This made
the exercise much more difficult and, ultimately, it was unsuccessful.
Consumer boycotts were more likely to succeed in competitive in-
dustries, as the printers' unions discovered. Newspapers were especially
vulnerable to the boycott as both the newspaper itself and its advertisers
could be targeted. One of the first newspaper boycotts was declared by
the Toronto Typographical Union (TTU) against the Telegram after its
publisher, John Ross Robertson, fired three printers for joining the union
in 1882. Numerous unions called on their members to support the
boycott.'27 Although this boycott was unsuccessful, the printers contin-
ued to use the tactic. In 1884, boycotts were declared against the Globe
and the Mail in Toronto and the Free Press in London. 28
In 1888 the TTU declared a boycott against the Toronto World after
it locked out its compositors. This time, the employer reacted by going
to law. They retained William Seton Gordon, author of the 1883 article
126. Palladium of Labor September 6, 1884, p. 4, cols. 2-3 ("It all depends on whose
ox is being gored."). On employer combinations, see Michael Bliss, A Living Profit
(Toronto, 1974), chap. 2 and "Another Anti-Trust Tradition: Canadian Anti-Combines
Policy, 1889-1910," Business HistoryReview 57 (1973); Russell Smandych, "The Origins
of Canadian Anti-Combines Legislation, 1890-1910,' in The Social Basis of Law, 2d
ed., ed. Stephen Brickey and Elizabeth Comack (Halifax, 1991), 35.
127. See Mail, April 4, 1882, p. 8, col. 4 (TTU); ibid., April 7, 1882, p. 2, col. 2
(TTLC); ibid., April 10, 1882, p. 2, col. 2 (boilermakers); ibid., April 12, 1882, p. 8,
cols. 3-4 (coopers, seamen, journeymen tinsmiths and laborers); ibid., April 13, 1882,
p. 8, col. 4 (bricklayers and stonemasons); ibid., April 17, 1882, p. 8, cols. 4-5 (painters);
ibid., April 21, 1882, p. 8, cols. 4-5 (cigarmakers); TTLC, Minutes, May 19, 1882. On
printers' boycotts generally, see Kealey, Toronto Workers, 91-95; Sally E Zerker, The
Rise and Fall of the Toronto Typographical Union 1832-1972: A case study of foreign
domination (Toronto, 1982), 95.
128. See Kealey, Toronto Workers, 91-92; Palladium of Labor June 21, 1884, p. 8,
col. I.
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published in the Canadian Law Times on the law of strikes, to obtain
an injunction restraining the union from issuing a circular proclaiming
a boycott. An interim order was issued by MacMahon J. and, three
weeks later, he made it permanent with the consent of the union's
lawyer. Faced with this restriction, the union movement developed other
responses. The TTLC refused to allow reporters from the World to
attend its meetings and urged its members to follow suit until such
time as the World made an honorable settlement with the TTU. Also,
to circumvent the injunction, lists of newspapers printed with union
labor were recommended with no mention being made of boycotted
ones.'29
This latter strategy resembled the union label campaigns, first utilized
by cigar makers on the west coast of the United States in the 1870s to
discourage employers from hiring Chinese workers. By 1880 the union
label was adopted by the Cigar Makers' International Union, the body
to which most Ontario locals were affiliated. 30 When unionized cigar
makers in Hamilton declared a boycott of cigars without the union
label in 1885, their employers responded by forming the Cigar Man-
ufacturers' Association. Members agreed not to hire union labor and
to pay five hundred dollars liquidated damages for breach of the agree-
ment. This contract was enforced by the court in an action brought
against a member who broke ranks. In the end, however, the workers'
boycott proved so effective that the Association gave in and re-hired
the unionized workers. 3 '
Another tactic used in some labor disputes was the political boycott.
In the case of newspapers, workers could be called upon not to vote
for candidates endorsed by a newspaper having a dispute with the union.
This occurred in the course of a dispute between the TTU and the
Mail. Numerous unions supported the printers' action and in that case
Manning, the incumbent mayor endorsed by the Mail, was defeated
by Howland. One month after the election, the Mail settled with the
129. Globe, July 17, 1888, p. 1, col. 5; ibid., July 18, 1888, p. 3, col. 4; ibid., July
19, 1888, p. 8, col. 4; ibid., July 20, 1888, p. 8, col. 2; ibid., July 26, 1888, p. 8, col. 2;
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union."' Employers with political ambitions were also vulnerable to
the political boycott. Recall that Withrow, a master carpenter, lost the
1883 Toronto mayoral election partly because of labor opposition trig-
gered by his actions in the 1882 carpenters' strike. In addition, during
the plasterers' strike of 1883, the Palladium of Labor urged its readers
to "black-list" the employers "so that when they come around, all smiles
and suavity, asking for the workingman's votes, one or two, or perhaps
twenty years hence, they may be known and treated as enemies."'33
Finally, there was the embargo that, in its classic form, involved a
refusal by a group of workers employed by one company to handle
materials produced by another company. For example, transportation
workers might refuse to handle goods produced by a manufacturer with
non-union labor. In effect, this allowed strong unions in one sector to
use their leverage to aid their weaker brothers and sisters. Another form
of the embargo was used to maintain union solidarity and discipline.
Union members might threaten to strike an employer who refused to
terminate the employment of a person who refused to join or had been
expelled from the union.
Political boycotts and the threat that unions might form their own
parties, were never legally controversial tactics, however much they
might be regretted by employers.'34 The various forms of economic
boycotts, however, came to be viewed in a different manner. Initially,
employers scoffed at union-organized economic boycotts. For example,
the Monetary Times described the boycott against the Telegram and
the merchants who advertised in it as an "absurd attempt.""'3 By the
mid- 1 880s, as the practice became more widespread and effective, em-
ployers began to take it far more seriously. The Monetary Times, in
response to a consumer boycott allegedly instigated by the Iron Moulders
Union against non-union employers, declared that it was "a significant
and menacing circumstance to find retaliation ... tak[ing] such a di-
abolical form."' 36 In a subsequent editorial, the boycott was denounced
as "a modem engine of compulsion" and reference was made to the
1882 boycott against the Telegram as well as contemporary boycotts in
132. Kealey, Toronto Workers, 92-93.
133. Palladium of Labor November 10, 1883, p. 2, col. 1.
134. For example, in the context of the 1887 Dominion elections, Canadian Man-
ufacturer February 18, 1887, pp. 99-100, published a letter denying the need for, and
pointing out the danger of, class representation. For an earlier expression of the same
sentiment, see Monetary Times, August 11, 1882, p. 151.
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the United States.137 Similarly, the Canadian Manufacturer reprinted
an interview with an anonymous Toronto banker published in the World.
The banker bemoaned, "that King Boycott rules Toronto today." He
reported that capitalists and employers would be meeting shortly to
devise a plan to resist boycotts and that they easily could raise one to
two hundred thousand dollars for this purpose.'38
Canadian employers were kept informed of the efforts of their Amer-
ican counterparts to obtain legal redress. The first American cases to
reach the courts arose out of consumer boycotts in New York City in
the spring of 1886. One of these, the boycott against Mrs. Gray's bakery,
became a rallying cry for those hostile to the boycott. Over one hundred
trade unionists were arrested and charged with a variety of crimes
including conspiracy, coercion, and extortion.'39 The accused were tried
after the Haymarket incident by Judge Barrett who "aimed above all
to establish unequivocally that the labor boycott could be punished as
a crime of conspiracy" '4 While Barrett conceded that workers enjoyed
the right to join trade unions, to strike, to beseech non-union workers
not to take their jobs, and to ask the public to respect their boycotts,
any attempt to injure the business of a recalcitrant employer, even
indirectly through pressure on others to boycott it, or to punish a
strikebreaker, was an indictable conspiracy. '
The Mail welcomed the indictments and was quick to distinguish
between the action of the TSR in dismissing its employees for joining
a trade union and the action of a union in boycotting. Employers,
except in the unusual case of the blacklist, did not attempt to prevent
their former employees from working elsewhere, while striking workers
"attempt to impede or put an end to their former employer's business
by intimidating non-union men who are willing to sell their labor to
him, or by using threats to prevent the sale or purchase of his goods ... " 4"
The labor press took a different view of the matter. The Palladium of
Labor characterized the New York prosecutions as "a judicial outrage"
and emphasized their unfairness by noting that employers were never
charged for blacklisting, which was the equivalent of a boycott. This
137. Ibid., April 30, 1886, p. 1239.
138. Canadian Manufacturer May 21, 1886, p. 289.
139. See Gordon, "Labor Boycott," 218-29; Laidler, Boycotts, 82-85.
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reasoning, see ibid. at 309-24.,
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kind of abuse ofjudicial power, the paper continued, fostered the growth
of anarchism. The following week another editorial denounced un-
elected state officials and especially "the judges and police magistrates,
who hold life offices and are independent of and irresponsible to the
people, known to lose no opportunity of showing their contempt and
hatred of the working-class. ' 143 The Palladium of Labor later reported
that one of the establishments involved was still being boycotted, despite
the actions of capitalists in making its open manifestations illegal. "The
working classes are not going to give up the most effective weapon that
has yet been discovered for striking terror into the souls of capitalist
tyrants quite so easily.
'1 44
Employers, while perhaps not terrified, were concerned that unions
were using the leverage they obtained from the boycott to interfere with
their prerogatives. For example, later that summer the Canadian Man-
ufacturer reprinted an article from the Chicago Times criticizing the
conduct of the Knights in a dispute with a plumbing contractor in New
York: "Believing that he was the owner of the establishment, and that
in this country a man has a right to manage his own property and
conduct his own business, .... he refused to obey the Powderly man-
date.... [I]n obedience to the laws of Powderly, the faithful subjects of
that American despot left the shop and proceeded to apply the boycott
penalty."
145
American employers, buoyed by their success in New York, pressed
criminal charges against boycotters in other states and found sympa-
thetic courts in Connecticut, Vermont, and Virginia. Their decisions
hampered the ability of trade unions to apply nonviolent economic
pressure against employers.1 46 These decisions, reported in the local
business and legal press, may have influenced Canadian employers and
their lawyers. 47 The Canadian Manufacturer shifted the focus of its
critique of unions. Instead of emphasizing how unions interfered with
143. Palladium of Labor, July 10, 1886, p. 4, col. 1; ibid., July 24, 1886, p. 3, col. 2.
144. Ibid., July 31, 1886, p. 4, col. 1.
145. Canadian Manufacturer August 6, 1886, p. 217.
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147. For example, see Monetary Times, March 25, 1887, p. 1128 (quoting Bradstreets,
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formed with the design of interfering by overt acts with the freedom of employers in
proper control and management of their business are illegal."). Also, see Canadian Law
Times 8 (1888): 122, 279 (noting American law journal articles on the subject); Canada
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the rights of employers to manage their enterprises, it began to complain
that unions interfered with the rights of individuals to work. This theme
first emerged in an editorial entitled "A National Disgrace." It began
by reprinting a story from the Toronto News, which told the tale of a
poor soul who, having fallen behind on his union dues, was barred
from working until they were paid. He was on the verge of hopelessness
when the Salvation Army intervened and paid off his dues. The News
treated the incident humorously. "That's the kind of Christianity I like.
We can't have too much of it in this country" The Canadian Manu-
facturer, however, saw the matter differently. "That such a species of
terrorism exists in our midst is a national disgrace.... The falsity of
the pretensions of these men is becoming apparent to the general public,
and the veil of hypocrisy which has heretofore shrouded their nefarious
practices from the public gaze is now being torn asunder " '48
Judge Cameron, who already distinguished himself as an outspoken
supporter of employers during the TSR strike, was quick to take up
the same line of attack. In April 1887, he was in Hamilton on the civil
assizes. One of the cases before him was Dean v. Ontario Cotton Mills, 1 49
one of the first cases to be decided under the recently enacted Workmen's
Compensation for Injuries Act. 50 During the trial, an allegation was
made that the Knights brought the action as a test case. Cameron, in
his address to the jury, dismissed the issue, but then commented: "Speak-
ing for myself individually, I do not think there is a more dangerous
organization in the community than the Knights of Labor;... the prin-
ciple promulgated by the order is an interference with individual liberty,
and the greatest blessing a people can enjoy is that each man is at
liberty to do just what he pleases as long as he does not interfere with
the rights of anybody else' 5 '
148. Canadian Manufacturer May 6, 1887, p. 271.
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The labor press anticipated and responded to this new line of attack.
The Canadian Labor Reformer decried the hypocrisy of those who
criticized the Knights for interfering with the individual liberty of work-
ers when the whole industrial system made it "necessary [for them] to
get the permission of some land or money king before they can earn
a living."'52 It also reprinted Cameron's comments and criticized him
for meddling in matters unrelated to the case before him and beyond
his competence.'53 A letter writer found irony in Cameron's criticism
of unions when he himself was a member of profession that would
blackball a lawyer "humane enough to plead a poor man's cause at a
cheap rate.' ' I"
The Canadian Manufacturer was undeterred and soon found a local
cause crlbre in Edward Buscombe, a bricklayer who had a long history
of conflict with the bricklayers and masons' union. According to the
union, Buscombe had taken work in Buffalo during a strike there in
1884, but had been induced to quit work, join the union, and accept
strike money. Soon afterward, however, he scabbed again and, after
repeated refusals to join the striking workers, he was suspended by the
union and fined ten dollars. He remained in Buffalo for some time and
next appeared in Hamilton as an employee of the city, along with other
non-union men, on the construction of a waterworks conduit in June
1887. A union delegation demanded that he be discharged. The Board
of Works initially refused, but -after the union men were pulled from
the job, they complied. Buscombe, however, was re-hired shortly there-
after and the union took no action until the end of August when it
sent a delegation, headed by David Gibson, to renew its complaint with
the city engineer and a number of aldermen. They intimated that, unless
Buscombe and the other non-union bricklayers were discharged, the
union men would be withdrawn from all city construction projects,
including the new city hall. Alternatively, Buscombe would be permitted
to re-join the union if he paid the costs incurred in his case and his
back dues, which together totalled 125 dollars. No action was taken."'
Buscombe was clearly not the sort of man who would back down
from a fight. He wrote a letter to the Hamilton Spectator denying he
had ever scabbed or joined the bricklayers' union. Rather, he had gone
to Buffalo and waited until the strike was broken. Then he, along with
152. Canadian Labor Reformer April 23, 1887, p. 5.
153. Ibid., April 30, 1887, pp. 5, 7.
154. Ibid., May 7, 1887, p. 6.
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The Faces of Coercion
union men, had taken jobs. Gibson had attempted unsuccessfully to
have him discharged and this was the cause of the bitter feelings. Bus-
combe derided Gibson for being a full-time business agent, or walking
delegate, who wore a white collar, smoked a big cigar and was paid
$3.20 a day. "Friend Gibson, put on your colored shirt again and go
to work like an honest man. Your laundry bill will never be paid by
me."6
The Canadian Manufacturer took up Buscombe's cause. On Septem-
ber 2, an editorial, entitled "Has the Poor Man Any Friends?" recounted
Buscombe's story and concluded: "The case is one of cruel, unjustifiable
and outrageous boycotting and it remains to be seen if the city authorities
dare discharge this humble laboring man at the insolent dictation of
the honorable (?) Knights of Labor.... The public is interested in know-
ing whether the municipal governments of the country are conducted
in the interests of the people generally, or on the dictation of insolent
and overbearing trade unions." ' 7 Two weeks later another Canadian
Manufacturer editorial, this time entitled "The Ethics of Tyranny,"
denounced "the fastidiously ethical tyrants of the Labor Unions [who]
have no ethical, moral or legal right to deprive any man of his job... even
if he is in arrears of dues to his union and refuses to pay up."' 58
Inspiration for the next step in the campaign was provided by a
decision of Judge Barrett in New York, arising out of one of the previous
spring's boycotts. Members of the Knights refused to work with a non-
union foreman who was alleged to have discharged a union member.
The Knights involved were arrested and charged with criminal con-
spiracy. Judge Barrett rejected the defense lawyer's argument that the
union's actions fell within the scope of a statutory immunity. Rather,
he held the exemption only applied to strikes for wages, not to strikes
conducted for other purposes. The Canadian Manufacturer reported
the decision, noted the similarity of Buscombe's case, and called upon
the authorities to charge Gibson and the other union delegates who
demanded his discharge with criminal conspiracy. "The law clearly
acknowledges the right of workmen to strike and quit work when they
see -proper, but it does not countenance or permit the strikers or any
acting for them to conspire to drive other workmen from their occu-
pation merely because they are obnoxious to them."' 59
156. Ibid., September 6, 1887, p. 1, cols. 1-2.
157. Canadian Manufacturer September 2, 1887, p. 149; ibid., p. 152 for two further
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Later that fall, the union resolved to boycott any newly contracted
jobs until Buscombe was fired. 6° When the city complied, the Canadian
Manufacturer repeated its call for criminal prosecution: "The action of
these union men is clearly a conspiracy to deprive an innocent man of
the rights and privileges guaranteed him by law. Has the poor man no
friends who will appeal to the law in his behalf, and have these con-
spirators arrested, tried, convicted and encased in striped clothing in
the penitentiary? Such is the punishment for conspiracy."6 Its campaign
continued through the winter and spring. The Canadian Manufacturer
sought unsuccessfully to have the matter taken up by the Royal Com-
mission on Relations Between Labour and Capital when it arrived in
Hamilton in mid-January 1888 to hear evidence.'62 It also found another
local victim of union oppression, Mrs. Farr, who had fallen on the street
and broken her arm while on her way to work. She had been forced
to take up domestic employment to support her family, it was alleged,
because her husband, a non-union bricklayer, was prevented by the
union from obtaining sufficient work during the season. The Canadian
Manufacturer once again called for these "heartless wretches" to be
prosecuted, and when Leonora Barry, an organizer for the Knights of
Labor, came to speak in Toronto later that spring, the paper appealed
to her "noble womanly instincts" and called upon her to investigate
"the systematic oppression that brought so much suffering and distress
upon your sister, Mrs. Farr, and upon her little children."163
Early that spring, the dispute over Buscombe was swept into a larger
conflict. Laborers at Hancock's quarry struck over hours of work. Han-
cock replaced the striking workers with non-union laborers. Laborers
and masons laying a new foundation at a project in Hamilton quit
work because the stone was coming from Hancock's quarry. The Build-
er's Exchange, an organization of Hamilton contractors (whose presi-
dent, incidentally, was Hancock), retaliated by locking out all union
workers employed by any of its members. 64
For the bricklayers and masons' union, one of the outstanding issues
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in the strike was the closed shop. This was particularly important because
the city had re-hired Buscombe. It was alleged that, at a meeting held
on April 19, the union passed a resolution forbidding its members from
working on the new city hall under threat of a fifty-dollar fine.1 65 This
was denied in a letter to the Hamilton Spectator a few days later, but
on April 27, William Mitchell and William Littlejohn, the alleged mover
and seconder of the motion, were arrested and brought before the
magistrate, charged with criminal conspiracy. A preliminary hearing was
held the following day. Two witnesses, John Watson and James Guthrie,
both former members of the union who had been present at the meeting,
gave evidence confirming that the resolution in question had been
passed. On the basis of their evidence, Mr. Mackelcan, Q.C., the lawyer
acting for Buscombe, was given permission to amend the summons by
adding David Gibson as a defendant. The three defendants were com-
mitted for trial at the next assize and released on bail. The Canadian
Manufacturer fully reported the proceedings.'66
The addition of Gibson as a defendant gave the case an even higher
profile than it might otherwise have enjoyed because, in addition to his
position with the union, Gibson was a leading figure in the Hamilton
Trades and Labour Council and a member of the Executive Committee
of the Trades and Labor Congress of Canada (TLC).
The assize of the Quarter Sessions of the Peace opened on June 12,
1888, with Judge Sinclair presiding. In his address to the grand jury,
Judge Sinclair sketched the factual background of the case. He also
expressed his personal opposition to boycotts, saying they were antag-
onistic to the principles of law and morality. The grand jury indicted
the defendants and a motion by Mr. Lynch-Staunton, counsel for the
defendants, to quash the indictment on the grounds that boycotting
was protected by the 1876 statute was set aside.'67
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The trial began on June 19. The jury was selected from the rural
districts "to obtain an unprejudiced and unbiased adjudication.""'6 The
prosecution called Watson and Guthrie who repeated their earlier tes-
timony. At the close of the prosecution's case, Lynch-Staunton renewed
his motion to dismiss. Sinclair again ruled against him, remarking that
the way the union had conducted its business was decidedly anarchistic
and did not come within the statute.'69 The following day the defense
opened its case, calling Piggott, the city hall contractor, to establish that
he, and not the union, had composed the resolution and caused it to
be published in the Hamilton Spectator."' The judge refused to allow
this line of questioning on the ground that it was irrelevant whether a
resolution boycotting Buscombe had been before the union. The defense
then called twenty-one witnesses who testified that a boycott resolution
was not passed at the union meeting. Their credibility was strongly
challenged in cross-examination by the prosecutor and, from the bench,
Sinclair questioned the men about whether they felt their oath to the
union was inconsistent with their oath to tell the truth in court.
Lynch-Staunton, in his jury address, challenged the credibility of the
prosecution's witnesses and defended trade unionism as the only way
workers could protect themselves against monopoly. He alleged that the
whole case was a conspiracy on the part of employers to frighten and
browbeat workers into submission. Crerar, the prosecutor, began his
address by attacking the credibility of the union's witnesses. Although
he acknowledged that workers could legally band together to fight mo-
nopoly, he insisted that, in this case, the union had united to tyrannically
oppress Buscombe, a poor working man. Following Crerar's address to
the jury, Sinclair instructed the jury. According to the Hamilton Spec-
tator's reporter, "it was strongly in favor of the prosecution." Sinclair
informed the jurors that they did not have to find that the resolution
was passed to convict; they merely had to find that the resolution was
statute books were revised and the 1876 provision on prosecution for criminal conspiracy
was re-enacted, in a slightly modified form so that, at the time of the Gibson prosecution,
section 13(2) provided: "No prosecution shall be maintainable against any person for
conspiracy to do any act, or to cause any act to be done for the purposes of a trade
combination, unless such act is an offence punishable by statute." R.S.C. 1886, c. 173.
Lynch-Staunton's argument was that the boycott against Buscombe was an act for the
purposes of a trade combination and that there was no statute under which boycotting
was an offense.
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proposed, seconded, and supported. He again cast doubt on the cred-
ibility of the defense witnesses, suggesting that the jury should consider
whether they were likely to adhere too closely to obligations imposed
on them by class. Finally, Sinclair instructed the jury to ignore the legal
question raised by counsel. The role of the jury was to decide whether
the tyrannical act had occurred and that a higher court would say
whether it was a conspiracy according to law. The jury deliberated for
half an hour and returned a verdict of guilty against each of the three
defendants.'7
The defendants appeared before Sinclair the following day. Lynch-
Staunton requested an adjournment to give him more time to decide
whether to appeal the decision on the point of law raised. Sinclair granted
leave, and also disclosed that he had received a telegram from a influ-
ential Brantford man requesting that he "season justice with mercy"
He indicated that he thought such communications improper and that
he would not be swayed by them. Despite this, he also made it clear
he did not intend to deal harshly with the prisoners. Rather, he would
vindicate the law by passing a nominal sentence.' 72 The defendants,
however, appealed and sentencing was put over pending the outcome.
The appeal was not argued until that November. The union retained
the services of B. B. Osler, Q.C. 73 Osler's argument was the same as
the one made by Lynch-Staunton at trial. Even if the alleged acts had
been committed (this was denied), no prosecution for conspiracy could
be maintained because of the immunity given by the 1876 statute. At
worst, it was a conspiracy for the purpose of a trade combination not
punishable by statute. Crerar, for the Crown, argued that the boycott
of Buscombe was not, in law, for the purpose of a trade combination
and that the common law offenses continued to apply. In support of
the later proposition, he cited an old English case on criminal com-
binations, R. v. Eccles, and drew the court's attention to the three leading
American cases on the criminality of boycotts, Glidden, Stewart, and
Crump. In reply, Osler referred to Hynes.'74
The court did not deliver its judgment until February 4, 1889. The
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three judges were unanimous in upholding the verdict. The most com-
prehensive judgment was delivered by Chief Justice Armour. In his
view, what the defendants conspired to do was not a protected activity
within the meaning of section 13 because it was not done for the purpose
of a trade combination-the regulation of relations between masters
and workers. Rather, the defendants were actuated by malice against
Buscombe and had conspired to deprive him of his employment. Ar-
mour would not accept that action taken to establish or maintain a
closed shop involved the regulation of relations between masters and
workers. In support of his legal conclusion, Armour cited the American
boycott cases and two English cases, Parnell and Mogul, neither of
which directly related to labor boycotts.'75 Once outside the ambit of
the immunity, workers could be charged with a common law criminal
conspiracy and the acts complained of did not have to be independently
punishable by statute.
In a concurring judgment, Street took a somewhat softer approach
than Armour's. For him, the characterization of the purpose of the
boycott was not a question of law, but of fact. It was for the jury to
determine whether the acts committed by the defendants were done
for the purpose of the combination, or for the malicious purpose of
injuring Buscombe. This difference was an important one. Because the
behavior could readily be characterized either way, Armour's per se
approach deprived unions of the opportunity of bringing themselves
within the immunity of the statute by arguing self-interest, a defense
that the English court in Mogul had specifically preserved. Falconbridge,
the third judge, did not take a position on this issue, and so no firm
holding could be derived from the case.'76
This left unresolved a number of questions regarding the scope of
permissible trade union action. First, there was the question of ihe
closed shop. Could a trade union insist, under threat of a strike or
boycott, that only union members be hired? Second, could a union
engage in what is now call "secondary" action? That is, could a trade
union strike an employer with whom it was not having a dispute, to
pressure another employer with whom it was? The broadest interpre-
175. Ibid., 713. The two English cases were R. v. Parnell (1881), 14 Cox C.C. 508
(setting out the parameters of criminal conspiracy) and Mogul S.S. Co. v. McGregor
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not to ruin competitors).
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tation of Gibson was that it criminalized boycotts in support of a closed
shop. A narrower one was that it only affected cases of secondary action.
Perhaps because it was ambiguous, the decision received little com-
ment at the time.' Frederic Nicholls, secretary of the Canadian Man-
ufacturers' Association and publisher of the Canadian Manufacturer,
expressed his satisfaction with the result of the case when he spoke to
the Association's annual general meeting in March. He also announced
that the men had been sentenced to three months imprisonment. This
punishment, he thought, was rather too severe. Although ignorance of
the law was no excuse, Nicholls thought more leniency was due because
the law had been unclear prior to this decision. Workers in the future,
however, would be deterred from making the same mistake.
In fact, the convicted workers had not yet been sentenced and, for
that reason, Nicholls' comments scandalized the legislative committee
of the TTLC. It accused him of fabricating the story of the three-month
sentence for the purpose of pleasing his audience and of hypocrisy for
his expression of regret at the severity of the sentences.'78
Sentencing actually occurred in June at the next assize. Sinclair re-
minded the defendants and the community of the events that gave rise
to the charges and reviewed the judgments of the higher court. He
sternly lectured the defendants about their misconduct and the evil it
would cause if not deterred by law. "If such conduct as yours were to
be permitted no man would be safe and honest labor could only be
exercised at the will of a trade union." As to the matter of sentence,
Sinclair used the occasion to vindicate the majesty of the criminal law.
"But the law is not disposed to evince towards you the same sort of
justice that you were prepared to mete out to Buscombe.... [Tihe
retributive justice of that [criminal] law is not vengeance, but example"
Its object was to teach the men and the community "that there is a
higher duty towards your fellow men than persecution" and the judge
hoped this would be the last time a court would be called upon to pass
judgment on laboring men in these circumstances. A five-dollar fine
was imposed.'79
177. Only the Hamilton Spectator commented. It took the broadest view of the
decision, saying that it ruled that all boycotting was illegal in Canada. This was clearly
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1889, p. 6, cols. 1-2; Mail, February 5, 1889, p. 3, cols. 1-2; Canadian Manufacturer
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This brought the legal case to an end, but not the controversy. Or-
ganized labor and its friends were quiet while the case was before the
courts but, even before sentence was passed, the campaign to reform
the law had begun. The story is complicated because of the uncertainty
of the law after Gibson, the growing conflict within the Knights of Labor
between Conservative and Liberal party supporters, and the competition
between Blake and Macdonald to claim the mantle of the worker's
friend. '80
The TLC convention in September 1888, reacted to the legal pro-
ceedings in two ways. The first was defensive, reflecting the chilling effect
of the prosecution. This manifested itself in a discussion over a resolution
to issue a warning that a company seeking to re-locate was hostile to
organized labor. Fears were expressed that such a resolution might expose
the Congress to charges of conspiracy. Gibson, one of the defendants and
a delegate to the Congress, moved that the resolution be referred to the
executive with power to act as it sees fit. The resolution passed.
The second response was proactive. Alf Jury moved that the Congress
should petition Parliament to amend the conspiracy laws "to prevent
their application to labor disputes, where no actual damage is done to
person or property." Speaking in support of the resolution, Jury did not
refer specifically to the Hamilton prosecution, but noted a number of
recent cases "in which the laws against conspiracy had been interpreted
by prejudiced judges so as to include under their operation alleged
offenses in which no injury could be shown to have resulted to either
person or property." The resolution was adopted unanimously. ' During
the next session of Parliament, John Wilson, a Liberal opposition mem-
ber from Elgin, introduced an amendment to reverse the effect of Ar-
mour's judgment in Gibson.'82 He proposed to insert the italicized words
so that the statute would read: "No prosecution shall be maintainable
against any person for conspiracy in refusing to work with or for any
employer or workingman, or for doing any act or causing any act to be
done for the purpose of a trade combination, unless such act is pun-
ishable by statute." Wilson referred directly to the Gibson judgment
and argued that workers should be free to refuse to be employed by or
with any one who is obnoxious to them. His amendment would have
decriminalized the primary boycott for a closed shop, but might still
180. See Kealey and Palmer, Dreaming, 248-76; Kealey, Toronto Workers, 267-68;
Bernard Ostry, "Conservatives, Liberals, and Labour in the 1880's,' Canadian Journal
of Economics and Political Science 27 (1961).
181. TLC, Proceedings (1888): 19, 23.
182. House of Commons, Debates, March 11, 1889, p. 524.
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have left the union vulnerable to prosecution for a secondary boycott,
or for any other action which a court or jury determined was not done
for the purpose of a trade combination.
Trade union lobbying around this reform was hampered by factional
fighting. Two of the lobbyists, Carey, the TLC's president, and O'Don-
oghue, chair of the TTLC's legislative committee, had strong Liberal
party connections and, presumably, worked closely with Wilson. 8 ' The
other labor lobbyist was R. R. Elliot, a Conservative Party supporter,
appointed by the Canadian Legislative Committee of the Knights of
Labor.'84 This led to a divided effort. In his report for the year, Elliot
explained that he had laid a certified copy of the evidence taken in the
Gibson trial and a copy of the judge's charge to the jury before John
Thompson, the Minister of Justice. Because at the time sentences had
not yet been pronounced, he had not asked for any action to be taken.
Then, when the sentences were given, they were so unexpectedly light
that Elliot had not seen any need to request the minister's intervention.
In commenting on Wilson's bill, Elliot deflected any criticism that might
have been leveled at the failure of the Conservative government to take
appropriate action. He noted that "owing to the looseness with which
it was drawn and the fact that its introduction was delayed by its
promoter till such time that it could not possibly pass during that session,
it was not seriously entertained" 85
Regardless of the internecine fights among the labor lobbyists, as an
opposition bill, Wilson's proposed amendment stood no chance of pas-
sage. He withdrew it after Thompson promised to introduce a measure
embodying its intent in the next session.'86 Needless to say, Elliot's
performance infuriated the Liberal wing of the labor lobby'8 7 At the
TLC convention that fall, Alf Jury moved, seconded by David Gibson,
that the Congress petition the government to enact Wilson's proposed
amendment.' 8
183. Mail, March 16, 1889, p. 2, col. 6; Mail, September 5, 1889, p. 4, col. 7; ibid.,
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The speech from the throne for the 1890 legislative session promised
legislation affecting the working classes and the government's address
expressed the view that a political response to labor's discontent was
required if violence and further inter-class strife was to be avoided.
Reference was made to the great strike in England and the war between
labor and capital in the United States; the speaker, Mr. Pope, urged the
passage of legislation that would "prove to the workingmen that their
best friends are within these legislative halls, and that we are prepared
to protect the laborer, the honest, industrious worker, and to appreciate
his citizenship as much as the citizenship of any other class which exists
in Canada.'9
On February 7, Thompson introduced Bill 65 to amend the criminal
law. In addition many other matters, including provisions making it a
criminal offense for an employer to seduce a female employee, the bill
proposed that a section 13(2) be amended as follows:190 "No prosecution
shall be maintainable against any member of a trade combination, for
conspiracy to do any act or to cause any act to be done, or to neglect,
or refuse, or omit to do any act, or to cause or procure the neglect,
refusal or omission to do any act, unless such act, or such neglect,
refusal or omission, as the case may be, is an offence punishable by
law." It is unclear what effect this amendment would have had. Although
it removed the words "for the purpose of a trade combination" from
section 13(2), it would have allowed prosecution for acts punishable by
law, not just statute. In effect, this would have allowed judges to continue
to apply the common law of criminal conspiracy without first having
to find that the acts committed were not "for the purpose of a trade
combination." As a result, boycotts in support of a closed shop and
secondary action could be treated as criminal conspiracies so long as
courts took the view that such acts were punishable by law.
Trade union lobbyists realized that Thompson's proposal was unsat-
isfactory and pressed to have it altered so that prosecutions would be
permitted only in cases where acts were punishable by statute. This
change, in conjunction with the elimination of the phrase "for the pur-
poses of a trade combination," would have immunized trade unionists
from charges arising under the common law of criminal conspiracy. For
this reason, Thompson rejected their proposal as he believed that con-
spiracies to commit common law crimes and particularly "boycotting in
189. Canada, House of Commons, Debates, January 16, 1890, p. 3; ibid., January
17, 1890, p. 7.
190. Bill 65, An Act further to amend the Criminal Law, 4th Sess., 6th Parl., 1890,
s. 18; and House of Commons, Debates, February 7, 1890, p. 342.
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its most malignant phase" should remain liable to prosecution. 9' So, by
second reading, one month later, Thompson proposed a compromise.
Bill 65 was amended so that it changed section 13(2) in exactly the way
Wilson had proposed the year before. The intended legal effect of the
change was to legalize primary action in support of a closed shop, but
to leave open the possibility of criminal conspiracy charges being brought
if there was a secondary boycott or other action courts found offensive.
When the amendment was discussed in committee, Edward Blake,
the leader of the Liberal opposition, reasserted the claim that he, not
Macdonald, was the worker's true friend. He reviewed the legislation
of the 1870s, emphasizing the broad scope of the immunity granted in
the 1876 act, passed while the Liberals were in power. He argued that
the 1886 revision had reduced the scope of that immunity by broaden-
ing the definition of prosecutable offenses from those only indictable
by statute to all statutory offenses. He called for the restoration of status
quo ante. In reality, however, this was an insignificant point that would
not have greatly reduced labor's exposure to prosecution. Nor would
this proposed rewording have responded to the secondary action aspect
of the Gibson decision. Judges and/or juries would still be able to
determine whether a particular action was undertaken to advance the
purpose of the combination. If it was not, the union would be exposed
to the full reach of common law criminal conspiracy.
Thompson, in his response to Blake, asserted that he had been lobbied
by labor organizations and consulted with them in drafting the bill. In
his view, the protection being offered trade unions went beyond what
their representatives had indicated was acceptable. Blake and Laurier
suggested that, perhaps, labor organizations and their advisers misun-
derstood the technical issues and that Thompson should do what is
right, not just what is requested. Thompson rejected the suggestion and
the bill was passed.'92
Clearly, Elliot had worked closely with Thompson and the Conserv-
atives and, presumably, had indicated his acceptance of the final draft.
He either misunderstood its effects, however, or chose not to disclose
its limits for in his report to the Knights of Labor he asserted, "The
effect of this will be to prevent the prosecution of workingmen on strike
under the common law, and, as the statutes expressly state the right of
workingmen to combine in labor organizations and to strike when they
deem it advisable, they cannot now be interfered with in the Dominion
191. House of Commons, Debates, April 10, 1890, pp. 3163-64.
192. Ibid., April 15, 1890, pp. 3372-79; ibid., April 16, 1890, pp. 3459-60; S.C. 1890,
c. 53, s. 19.
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of Canada unless they commit some act of violence." '93 Liberal Party
supporters in the labor movement backed Blake, and thanked him for
trying to restore all the protection afforded by the 1876 statute.'94 They
gave no credit to the Conservative government, even though the law it
passed was identical to the one the TTLC supported the previous session.
Perhaps they misunderstood the legal significance of the various pro-
posals or their deliberations were driven by partisan political consid-
erations. In either event, labor did not put up a strong, united front to
secure the broadest immunity possible.
Employers seemed to have ignored entirely the maneuvering over
the amendment to section 13(2). None of the participants in the House
of Commons debates indicated they had been lobbied by business in-
terests on this question. Even the Canadian Manufacturer, which had
led the campaign for criminal prosecution in the Gibson case, was silent
on this aspect of the government's bill. Instead, it focused all its energy
on that part of the bill that made factory owners liable to prosecution
for seduction of female employees. "Why should the Minister alienate
the respect of a respectable element for the sake of obtaining the be-
slobberment of the Knights of Labor?""19 Is it possible that employers
became so obsessed with the criminal seduction provisions that they
overlooked reform of criminal conspiracy law? This is unlikely. Perhaps
the Canadian Manufacturer recognized that Thompson's amendment
would not prevent trade union members from being prosecuted for
conspiracy to commit common law crimes and this was sufficient for
them.
In any event, employers once again found that the invocation of the
law to gain an advantage in a trade dispute produced mixed results.
The court opened a common law door to the use of more coercive legal
strategies by employers of the sort that had become common in the
United States, but labor still exercised sufficient political clout to get
legislation enacted to shut it, at least partially. Ontario employers, how-
193. Report of the Canadian Legislative Committee of the Knights of Labor (1890).
194. Mail, April 19, 1890, p. 12, cols. 6-7. The depth of this confusion or partisanship
was reflected in the lobbying of the TTLC around amendments to the draft criminal
code produced by the federal government in 1891. See E C. Cribben, secretary TTLC,
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amendment and sought to clarify that concerted refusals to work would not be criminal
conspiracies, regardless of their purpose. See George Lynch-Staunton to the deputy
minister of justice, May 13, 1891, NAC RG 13 Al 492/1891. My thanks to Professor
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ever, did not try to exploit the space that remained for the operation
of the law of criminal conspiracy. At most, only one other conspiracy
case was brought against workers in Ontario to the end of the century. 96
Conclusion
Assessing the role of law in the labor conflicts of the 1880s presents
many challenges. Certainly, we find figures such as Police Magistrate
Denison who behaved like stock characters in historical dramas whose
scripts conform to prior expectations about the hostility of judges to
workers' collective action. As these case studies reveal, however, the
record is almost always more ambiguous and complex than that. Judge-
made and statutory law were not infinitely malleable instruments through
which the ruling classes could directly exert their authority over a passive
working class.
In none of the cases we examined was the outcome totally one-sided.
In the plasterers' strike an injunction was obtained, but the judge ul-
timately exercised his discretion to discontinue it and found workers
charged with contempt not guilty on a technicality. Moreover, not only
did the strikers pay little heed to the injunction, but it was not strictly
enforced by the police, although two workers were convicted of breach-
ing the 1876 act. In the Toronto Street Railway lockout and strike, the
police used force to clear the crowds and the courts punished a number
of people who obstructed the street railway's operations. But given the
potential for violent confrontation during street car strikes,'97 the actual
level of coercion exercised was modest and it did not bring victory to
the employer, at least not initially. Finally, members of the masons'
union were convicted of conspiracy for boycotting city projects until
Buscombe was fired, but one year later the law was amended to im-
munize trade unionists from prosecution for refusing to work with
another employee. The government, however, was not prepared to pre-
clude all prosecutions for conspiracies to commit common law crimes.
The complex relation of the law to industrial conflict becomes even
more apparent when we consider that the case studies involved excep-
tional events. As a general matter, direct state coercion occurred infre-
196. This occurred in the Windsor tailors' strike in 1891. The report is unclear as
to the charges. Labor Advocate, September 18, 1891, p. 332.
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quently in strikes and lockouts. Direct legal or police involvements
occurred in only sixteen out of 238 strikes in Ontario from 1880 to
1889 (see Table 1). Moreover, police interventions were rarely violent.
Over the course of the decade, not a single worker was killed in Ontario
as a result of strike-related activity. The greatest use of force occurred
in the TSR strike, but even then no one was seriously injured. The
militia was called up in aid of the civil power only once when laborers
rioted after a railroad contractor in Port Rowan failed to pay them.
The incident was not considered serious, however.'98
The low level of direct state coercion starkly contrasts with the Amer-
ican experience where criminal conspiracy prosecutions were far more
common and the punishments meted out tended to be far more severe,
even when the conduct complained of was similar to the non-violent
forms of economic pressure employees were exerting in Ontario. Over
one hundred trade unionists were sentenced to penitentiary terms for
boycotting in New York City alone in 1886.99 Little work has been
done on the use of the general criminal law, including charges of assault,
riot, and damage to property in the context of strikes in the United
States, making comparisons somewhat tenuous. The murder charges
brought against the Haymarket defendants and the execution of four
of them are, perhaps, suggestive of a more repressive use of this aspect
of the law. The labor injunction also developed much earlier in the
United States. Although the period of "government by injunction" did
not begin until the 1890s, actions in both state and federal courts were
already becoming commonplace in the 1880s.2°° The use of police and
military force against striking workers in the United States was far more
frequent and deadly than in Ontario. 0 Finally, employers supplemented
198. D. Morton, "Aid to the Civil Power: The Canadian Militia in Support of Social
Order, 1867-1914;' Canadian Historical Review 51 (1970); J. J. B. Pariseau, Disorders,
Strikes and Disasters: Military Aid to the Civil Power in Canada, 1867-1933 (Ottawa,
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shantymen were not paid for work performed the previous winter. Mail, May 18, 1889,
p. 12, col. 2.
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Table 1. Strikes with Judicial/Police Involvement, Ontario, 1880-891
Date Place Occupation Judicial/Police Involvement
May 1880 London Printers
April 1881 Hamilton Coal
Haulers
April 1882 Toronto Freight
Handlers
April 1882 Brockville Long-
shoremen
April 1882 Brockton Laborers
Nov. 1883 Toronto Plasterers
Feb. 1886 Toronto Laborers,
Iron
Molders
March 1886 Toronto Street Car
Workers
Aug. 1887 Toronto Carpenters
Apprentices charged with
leaving employment
Police called
Police called
Charges arising out of fight
Assault charge
Injunction, contempt, charges
under 1876 Act
Police called
Police called, various charges
Police called, charge of
threatening language
July 1888 Toronto Plumbers Police called, charges of
intimidation
July 1888 Gravenhurst Mill hands
Aug. 1888 Toronto Printers
Feb. 1889 Ayr Iron
Molders
April 1889 Hamilton Masons
May 1889 Port Rowan Railway
Construction
Workers
June 1889 Toronto Bakers
Charges of trespass,
intimidation and conspiracy
Injunction restraining call for
boycott
Police protection
Criminal conspiracy
Militia called out
Police called
The list is admittedly incomplete. I examined all strikes in Toronto, Hamilton, and
London, the three largest strike centers, which account for 176 strikes, or nearly seventy
percent of the total. Other sources examined include the labor press, proceedings of
labor bodies, the business press, and the Ontario Bureau of Industries' Annual Reports.
While it is possible I have missed some strikes with judicial or police involvement, it
is unlikely further research will significantly alter the picture. This is because strikes
with such involvement attracted publicity and generated paper trails in the press and
in the courts. Further references for the strikes identified in the table but not discussed
in the text are in the author's possession.
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the public forces with private police who quickly developed a reputation
for violence.2 12 There was no equivalent use of private police in Ontario.
The case studies and the data on the incidence of judicial and police
involvement in strikes raise a number of difficult questions. Why was
so little direct legal coercion used during this decade of labor strife?
Under what circumstances did employers and state officials resort to
such strategies in Ontario? Why were the forces of law and order used
so much more coercively in the United States than in Ontario? Recent
American scholarship suggests that these questions can be answered
through an examination of the institutional settings in which class
conflict was conducted and that, in particular, the strength of the courts
relative to the legislatures was crucial.20 ' These state-centered studies
have generated important insights into the trajectory of the American
labor movement in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries,
but have not adequately explained why employers and state officials
resorted to this degree of coercion.
The availability of powerful, sympathetic courts does not fully explain
why employers invoked their power. Judges in Ontario did not behave
that differently than their American counterparts, except in regard to
sentencing. When asked, they enjoined striking workers from interfering
with the hire of replacement workers and from calling a boycott; they
broadly interpreted the scope of common law criminal conspiracy and
they convicted workers charged with strike-related criminal offenses.
Ontario employers, however, did not seek judicial intervention as fre-
quently as American employers. Similarly, strong courts and weak states
do not explain the level of violence used by police and militia in
enforcing court orders and maintaining "public order," or the use of
private police by employers. An alternative state- and law-centered
answer to the question of why direct legal coercion was less common
in Ontario than in the United States, is that law was more strongly
hegemonic. Hegemonic law would reduce both the need for direct
coercion and the eagerness to resort to it. The need would be reduced
if, through law, employers and state officials, including judges and mag-
istrates, were able to obtain the consent of workers to the existing regime
by, in effect, convincing them of its legitimacy, normality and, perhaps,
inevitability. As a result, workers would be more respectful of legal
norms, reducing the need to resort direct legal coercion. Also, employers
and state officials might be less eager to act coercively because displays
of excessive force could undermine consent. A condition of legal he-
202. Frank Morn, "The Eye That Never Sleeps" (Bloomington, 1982), chap. 5.
203. See, e.g., Forbath, Law and the Shaping and Hattam, Labor Visions.
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gemony is that law must be seen to take into account, at least to some
extent, the interests of the subordinate class. Law becomes a medium
through which compromises are negotiated and this constrains the dom-
inant class's use and manipulation of it in nakedly coercive and self-
interested ways.2"u
Was labor law in Ontario in the 1880s strongly hegemonic? The
question is difficult to answer, in part, because it is hard and perhaps
artificial, to isolate law from other ideological systems. Clearly, a partial
class compromise was reached in Ontario, and it was partly achieved
through, and institutionalized in, law. But law was only mildly hege-
monic. Support for this conclusion can be found, for example, in the
speeches of working-class leaders and intellectuals pointing to the gap
between law and justice. Recall in the plasterers' strike, Chase's response
to Hynes's threat to "insist upon the strong arm of the law" to permit
replacements. "Mr. Hynes can have all the law. We simply want jus-
tice."" 5 Similarly, the Palladium of Labor and the Canadian Labor
Reformer regularly condemned the law, particularly when judge-made,
as class-biased, unjust, and undemocratic. Although legislated labor law
fared somewhat better, it too was accorded limited legitimacy. "Popular
government as it exists at present in Canada, the United States and
Great Britain is a sham and a farce," declared the Palladium of Labor °6
and, as a result, workers could not expect their interests to be protected
by the legislature.
Were judges and magistrates restrained by a perceived need to main-
tain the appearance of neutrality and fairness between the parties? Here
the picture is decidedly mixed. Denison felt no compunction about
taking the employers' side, and recurring complaints about his conduct
do not seem to have affected his behavior. Cameron, an arch-Tory with
a long history of anti-worker and anti-union sentiment, was similarly
unrestrained by such concerns. Other officials were more sensitive,
however. In both Hynes cases, Wilson's equation of economic coercion
by employers with physical coercion by the plasterers was quite re-
markable and, in the Gibson case, while Sinclair expressed an extremely
hostile attitude toward worker boycotts, he clearly saw the ideological
value of mercy in sentencing.
204. E. P. Thompson, Whigs and Hunters (New York, 1975), 258-69.
205. Globe, November 8, 1883, p. 6, col. 3.
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Did this restraint, such as it was, lend legitimacy to law in the eyes
of workers? There is little evidence on this point. Undoubtedly, indi-
vidual defendants in Hynes and Gibson were relieved, but labor rep-
resentatives did not praise Wilson, Sinclair, or the legal system. In respect
of Gibson, Elliot, the labor lobbyist, reported that the sentence was
lighter than anticipated "for a reason which we are not in a position
to explain." Certainly, the law under which they were convicted was
not vindicated by this exercise of mercy. All that was eliminated was
the need to carry through with plans to seek executive clemency. The
campaign for legislative reform was as urgent as ever.207
Why was labor law in Ontario only weakly coercive and mildly
hegemonic? The answer, I suggest, is to be found by examining the
interaction between the development of class relations and the particular
form of their institutionalization. In an earlier period, from 1837-77,
there was a conflict between the social zone of toleration for trade
unions and the formal legal zone of toleration. By the third quarter of
the nineteenth century, trade unions had become accepted as legitimate
organizations on the understanding that workers should be free to com-
bine for the purposes of improving wages and other terms and conditions
of employment. The willingness of employers to tolerate trade unions
during this period was rooted in the practice of paternalism and pre-
vailing labor-market conditions. To a significant extent, employers and
skilled workers still saw themselves sharing a common space as pro-
ducers, albeit within a framework in which deference was due the
employer, property rights would be respected and no acts of physical
coercion would be committed. In exchange, employers exhibited a mea-
sure of loyalty to the worker and respected certain artisanal norms.2 °0
Moreover, labor surpluses gave employers confidence that the labor
market would operate in their favor and exert a disciplining influence
on any group that attempted to defy its logic. Most of the skilled elements
of the working class accepted this compromise.
A similar process occurred in Great Britain during this period. Alan
Fox has argued that by the third quarter of the century, employers and
politicians were coming to accept trade unions as legitimate organi-
zations for the protection of working-class interests in the labor market
207. Report of the Canadian Legislative Committee of the Knights of Labor (1889),
11.
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and to allow greater working-class participation in politics."° This was
facilitated by the economic buoyancy of the time, which provided a
margin for concessions to the upper strata of the working class, promoted
social stability, and generated a mood of optimism about the ability of
the system to integrate trade unions as a junior partner in the system
of industrial regulation. As well, trade unions adopted "'accommo-
dative' postures toward the broad social structures of wealth, power and
status"" ' ° Indeed, employer acceptance was contingent on trade unions
agreeing to represent their members' interests within the emerging in-
dustrial capitalist system. "Irresponsible" trade union conduct could
evoke a coercive response by the police, state officials, and employers,
all with legal support. In any event, there were material benefits to be
gained from participating in the emerging system of collective bargain-
ing, especially for organized craft workers who constituted the backbone
of the union movement. Finally, there were ideological and cultural
supports for this accommodative strategy, especially among the labor
aristocracy. Their inculcated individualism, desire for respectability, and
sense of hierarchy undermined efforts to create a broader-based labor
movement committed to the transformation of the prevailing capitalist
regime.'
The significance of the British experience for Canada does not lie in
any claim about the equivalence of the conditions that gave rise to and
supported a compromise. Clearly, there were both similarities and dif-
ferences, but it had a direct impact in at least two different ways. First,
British immigrants to Ontario brought with them a culture and outlook
shaped by their experience. Skilled workers expected their trade unions
would be accepted here, just as in mid-Victorian England, and they
had already learned the "rules of the game."" ' The second impact was
through the legal system, and here we must step back and clarify the
role of law in the compromise.
Judge-made law was not the vehicle through which the compromise
was achieved. Legal doctrines that treated trade unions as criminal
conspiracies were inconsistent with the social space that had been cre-
ated. Workers and law reformers resented these regressive laws and
sought, and incrementally achieved, immunity from them in the third
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quarter of the nineteenth century. This was done by legislation that
paradoxically ousted "the law" from labor relations. Moreover, because
English employers in the 1880s resorted to law infrequently, the judges
had limited opportunities to develop innovative doctrines to challenge
this ouster. 13
These developments in England provided a model for institutional-
izing a class compromise in Canada, and did not produce legal prec-
edents for attacking it. Canadian politicians copied English labor law
statutes and so the legalization of trade unions and basic trade union
activity was accomplished through statutory immunities from prose-
cution under the common law. The enactment of Canada's Trade Union
Act in 1872 was understood as a foundational event and, for that reason,
Blake and Macdonald fought continuously over who could claim the
lion's share of the credit. The intervention by Blake in the 1890 debates
over the amendment to the criminal conspiracy law was but one example
of this. 214
Thus, at the beginning of the 1880s, the dominant understanding
among employers was that labor relations were to be conducted within
the market,"5 but without resort to common law prosecution of workers
for joining trade unions, participating in strikes, or peacefully picketing.
Employers could accept this, even as paternalistic work relations were
becoming more strained, because they felt reasonably secure behind
tariff walls and because they were still confident that the trade unions
they knew could not defy the law of the market. This attitude was
reflected in the pages of the Monetary Times and the Canadian Man-
ufacturer.
The events of the mid-1880s challenged this compromise. Not only
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The Faces of Coercion
did the level of class conflict increase, but so too did its character. The
organization of the Knights, in particular, posed a threat. They did not
just critique lawyers and the legal system supporting market relations;
they challenged the justice of the labor market itself. As Kealey and
Palmer have argued, "[iun the Ontario of the 1880s,... there was an
alternative hegemony in formation?' 2 6 The efforts of the Knights to
organize workers on a broader basis and to develop solidaristic strategies,
like the boycott, led employers to fear that the Knights might actually
be able to defy market forces. Even this challenge, however, did not
cause many employers to resort to direct legal coercion. They also did
not seek to have more coercive laws enacted, although the temptation
to do so was there."17 As figure 3 suggests, directly coercive law was a
factor to be reckoned with, but its full force rarely came down on the
backs of labor.
A full answer to the question of why law was used so much more
coercively in the United States than in Ontario is beyond the scope of
this article. Institutional factors undoubtedly played a significant role.
The greater constitutional power of American courts, the place of law
in American culture, and the more frequent use of law to resolve disputes
are part of this. Also, Canadian employers, workers, and state officials
witnessed the level of violence and direct state coercion in American
labor relations and wished to avoid it. But these institutional and cultural
factors do not tell the whole story. Equally important are the reasons
for the higher level of class conflict in the United States during this
period; for example, Laslett has argued that the American labor move-
ment was "more advanced" than the British in its political and orga-
nizing strategy, and that this was the result of the more rapid growth
of large-scale manufacturing and the earlier rise of monopolies in key
sectors.2"8 Even the biggest British firms were much smaller than their
American counterparts, as small family firms dominated English man-
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Figure 3. Grip, January 28, 1888, p. 10.
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ufacturing well into the 1880s. 2' 9 Although Ontario experienced rapid
industrial growth in the 1880s, including the growth of large manufac-
turing enterprises, the scale of enterprise was significantly smaller than
in the United States. For example, manufacturing firms in Chicago
employed an average of twenty-one workers in 1890 while the average
in Toronto for 1891 was 11.6. In 1886, McCormick's reaper works in
Chicago employed 1,381 workers while the Massey Agricultural Im-
plements Company employed seven hundred and was the largest factory
in Toronto. 20 The larger scale of production in the United States was
associated with increased mechanization, greater displacement of skilled
labor, and intensification of work, all of which met with worker resis-
tance.22' Heightened class conflict was the inevitable outcome. More
radicalized workers organized in militant unions were perceived by
employers and state officials to pose a threat to the social and labor
market order, which required a repressive response. Again, comparisons
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between Chicago and Toronto workers in the 1880s are instructive. The
Knights of Labor was the most advanced working-class organization of
any size in Toronto, while in Chicago there was a strong movement of
socialists and anarchists advocating more radical platforms and courses
of action. One final factor was the greater ethnic diversity of a city like
Chicago. Immigrants from central and eastern Europe came with dif-
ferent cultural and political traditions, and their concentration among
the least skilled and most radical elements of the working class made
it easier for employers and state officials to characterize their activities
as un-American and, therefore, dangerous.222 In sum, just as law shaped
the American labor movement, the dimensions and intensity of class
struggle shaped the law and, more important, the way it was used.
The later development of Canada's second industrial revolution may
be the key to understanding why coercive labor law was less important
in Ontario than in the United States. It may also explain why, at the
turn of the century, as class conflict intensified in conjunction with this
new wave of industrial growth, law became significantly more important
in Canada, both as an instrument of direct coercion and as a means
for legitimating capitalist relations of production. The simultaneous
development of the law's coercive and legitimating capacities in this
century, however, is a story or, perhaps, book for another day.
222. Nelson, Beyond the Martyrs.
